The Fifth Amendment: If an Aid to the Guilty Defendant, an Impediment to the Innocent One by Tague, Peter W.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
1989 
The Fifth Amendment: If an Aid to the Guilty Defendant, an 
Impediment to the Innocent One 
Peter W. Tague 
Georgetown University Law Center, tague@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/702 
 
78 Geo. L.J. 1-70 (1989) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons 
ARTICLES
The Fifth Amendment: If an Aid to the Guilty
Defendant, an Impediment to the Innocent One
PETER W. TAGUE*
The fifth amendment's privilege not to answer, critics carp, insulates the
guilty defendant from revealing his complicity.' While this is true, ironically
it also can shackle the innocent defendant from attempting to prove that
another person committed the crime. If that other person asserts the fifth
amendment in response to questions designed to substitute him for the de-
fendant, the innocent defendant can neither surmount that person's assertion
nor benefit therefrom.
Consider this set of facts. A murder is committed. Defendant,2 charged
with the crime, has evidence that Witness killed the victim. The prosecution
believes only one person committed the crime.3 Witness, subpoenaed by the
defense to testify during Defendant's trial, informs defense counsel prior to
trial that he will assert the fifth amendment and refuse to testify.4 In turn,
defense counsel notifies the judge of Witness' intent.5 The court conducts a
hearing to learn whether Witness will exercise the fifth amendment privilege
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Many luminaries in the United Kingdom and the United States have criticized or worried
about the privilege against self-incrimination. Among them are Bentham, Wigmore, Corwin,
Pound, Cardozo, Morgan, and Friendly. See Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case
for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 672-74 (1968) (listing citations). For a particu-
larly caustic examination, see the United Kingdom's CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMITTEE,
ELEVENTH REPORT: EVIDENCE (GENERAL), 28-31 (Cmnd. 4991) (1972) [hereinafter ELEV-
ENTH REPORT].
2. This article will identify the class of defendants that call a witness who asserts the fifth amend-
ment as "Defendant" and the class of people who assert the fifth amendment as "Witness." When
discussing the participants in a particular case or the general class of defendants or witnesses, the
word will not be capitalized.
3. The other two common situations in which Witness' assertion of the privilege might thwart
Defendant's defense are (1) claims by Defendant-1 that Defendant-2 alone committed the crime, or
(2) claims that Defendant-2 would say Defendant-1 did not participate in a multi-culprit crime if he
were to testify truthfully. For examples of these three settings, see infra Part l.A.
4. In practice, of course, defense counsel is likely to learn of Witness' reluctance to help Defend-
ant in a less structured way: by inferring that intent from Witness' attempt to avoid being subpoe-
naed or by learning of Witness' intent only when he appears in court in response to a subpoena.
5. If the attorney knows (and arguably if he suspects) that Witness will assert the fifth amend-
ment, he risks acting unethically by calling Witness to testify. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
PROJECT ON STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 97, 132
(1974) (neither prosecutor nor defense counsel may call witness who will assert privilege). The
prosecutor also risks committing reversible error by calling Witness, although few appellate courts
will grant relief. See United States v. Namet, 373 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1963) (although prosecutor
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not to testify, and to decide whether he may do so. During the hearing,
Witness refuses to answer questions, the truthful answers to which, the de-
fense contends, would substitute Witness for Defendant as the culprit. In
light of the defense's startling contention and other evidence of Witness' guilt
that the defense unwraps, the court understandably accepts Witness' claim
that he might incriminate himself if he were to testify truthfully. Thus, the
court holds that Witness need not testify.
Blocked by Witness' assertion of the privilege, Defendant implores the
prosecution to grant "use plus derivative-use" immunity to force Witness to
testify.6 Defendant fails to cajole the prosecution or convince the court to
compel the prosecution to grant use immunity to Witness.7 Thwarted in his
attempt to force Witness to testify, defense counsel asks the court to have
Witness assert the fifth amendment in front of the jury in response to ques-
tions he (and the prosecutor) will pose. Defense counsel also asks for permis-
sion to invite the jury in his summation to draw inferences in Defendant's
favor from Witness' assertion of the privilege. The court denies these
motions.
At trial, the defense introduces evidence which indicates that Witness
alone killed the victim. When the court refuses to let Witness appear before
the jury, defense counsel fears the jury may infer that Defendant has falsely
concocted Witness' existence. To salvage what he can, defense counsel urges
the court to instruct the jury that it must draw no inference against either
side from Witness' failure to appear.8 The court agrees, and so instructs the
jury.9 The court, of course, permits defense counsel to argue in summation
that the jury may draw inferences in Defendant's favor from whatever evi-
dence of Witness' guilt the defense has introduced.
knew of Witness' intent to assert fifth amendment privilege, prosecutor did not deliberately seek to
benefit from it).
6. "Use plus derivative-use" immunity protects the witness from the prosecution's use of the
testimony or its fruits. United States v. Kastigar, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). Given this type of
immunity Witness must testify or risk being found in contempt. Use plus derivative-use immunity is
constitutional. See id. (fifth amendment does not require transactional immunity, which protects
the witness from prosecution for any crime he mentions while testifying; "use plus derivative-use"
immunity is coterminous with the constitutional privilege). Throughout the remainder of this arti-
cle, "use plus derivative-use" immunity is shortened to "use immunity."
7. The reasons for this are explained infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
8. Defense counsel does not want the judge to instruct the jury that neither side can call Witness
to testify because he hopes that the jury might infer that the prosecution could (and should), even if
the defense could not. And this is accurate: the prosecution could force Witness to testify by
granting use immunity to him, a power Defendant lacks.
9. See Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 545-46 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en bane) (Bazelon, C.J.,
dissenting) (when only defense was that Witness and not Defendant committed crime, it was error
for trial court to fail to instruct jury that no inference could be drawn from Witness' absence at
trial), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971); see also 2 Weinstein's Evid. (MB) V 513[02] (1989) (judge
may instruct jury that Witness is unavailable and cannot appear).
[Vol. 78:1
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In this sorry story, three impediments block Defendant from obtaining
evidence from Witness. First, Witness has the right to remain silent. Sec-
ond, the prosecution need not grant use immunity to Witness. 10 Finally, De-
fendant may neither force Witness to assert the fifth amendment before the
jury, nor ask the jury to evaluate why Witness has exercised the privilege.
The last impediment is the topic of this article.
The topic arises because of the interplay of the law governing a witness'
fifth amendment privilege and the prosecution's monopoly over granting use
immunity. Although a nondefendant cannot refuse to be called to testify (as
the defendant can), he can invoke the fifth amendment to refuse to answer.
If Witness asserts in advance of trial his intention to invoke the fifth amend-
ment, and if the prosecution refuses to grant use immunity, the court will
invoke a categorical rule against benefitting from a witness' assertion of privi-
lege. Thus, the court will prevent Defendant from calling Witness before the
jury.
Our criminal justice system could have protected witnesses in a different
manner. A witness could have been required to testify, but the prosecution
prevented from using that testimony and its fruits against him.'1  Or, the
prosecution could have been required to justify its refusal to grant use immu-
nity to Witness.' 2 Instead, except in a few idiosyncratic cases, 13 courts have
10. For an argument that courts have the constitutional tools to grant immunity or to force the
prosecution to grant immunity, see Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 73,
168 (1974). But cf Flanaghan, Compelled Immunity for Defense Witnesses: Hidden Costs and
Questions, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 461-63 (1981) (arguing against grant of immunity at least
in multi-culprit crimes because of prosecution's difficulty in eventual prosecution of Witness in
proving it gathered evidence apart from Witness' testimony).
11. Canada takes a similar approach. See Canada Evidence Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. E-10,
§ 5(l)-(2) (1970) (witness must answer); id. ch. E-10, § 5(2) (prosecution cannot use testimonial
admissions of a witness who objects that he will incriminate himself by answering). Even a copar-
ticipant must testify, as long as he is charged separately from the defendant. Re Regan, 2 D.L.R.
135, 137-38 (N.S. 1939). With respect to the fruits of coerced testimony, Canada does not provide
the protection suggested in the text. In contrast to the U.S. approach prohibiting the prosecution
from using the fruits of compelled testimony, see Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585-86
(1892), in Canada these fruits are admissible. See also REPORT OF THE FEDERAL/PROVINCIAL
TASK FORCE ON UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 429 (1982) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]
(Canadian task force considered and rejected several proposals granting an indicted witness the
privilege against self-incrimination).
Also supporting this reinterpretation of witness' rights is the historical evidence that the fifth
amendment was intended to protect only the criminally accused. Historically, a witness who had
not been charged with a crime had a common law, but not a constitutional, privilege not to testify.
See Mayers, The Federal Witness' Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Constitutional or Common
Law? 4 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 107 (1960).
12. Were the prosecution required to defend its refusal to grant use immunity, the topic of this
article would remain important in those cases, predictably few, in which the prosecution succeeded
in justifying its refusal.
13. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has fashioned relief for the defendant in two situations.
In the first, the court can order the prosecution to grant use immunity to a defense witness when the
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doggedly refused to force the prosecution to grant use immunity to defense
witnesses, or to justify their refusal to do so. 14
Not surprisingly, the prosecution, free of a judicial order to grant use im-
munity, has obdurately refused to extend this protection. As long as Defend-
ant cannot try to profit from Witness' privilege assertion, the prosecution can
gain tactically by not granting use immunity to Witness. The jury will never
see Witness and never hear him assert the privilege in response to accusato-
rial questions. Defendant can neither surmount Witness' privilege nor ask
the jury to wonder what Witness hides behind it. But, if Defendant could
force Witness to assert the privilege before the jury and thereby encourage
prosecution has withheld that grant for the purpose "of distorting the judicial factfinding process."
United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913 (1979);
accord Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 968-69 (3d Cir. 1980) (prosecutor with exclusive
jurisdiction over juvenile witness whom defendant wanted to call would have granted use immunity
as long as the U.S. Attorney agreed; wrong for U.S. Attorney to withhold agreement); see also
People v. Shapiro, 50 N.Y.2d 747, 762, 409 N.E.2d 897, 904, 431 N.Y.S.2d 422, 429 (1980) (error
for prosecution to withhold immunity from defense witnesses who asserted fifth amendment only
after prosecution threatened to prosecute them for perjury if they testified). Other courts have
suggested the same result in dictum or have been reversed for ordering the prosecution to choose
between granting use immunity and another sanction. See Earl v. United States, 361 F.2d 531, 534
n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (suggesting prosecution cannot grant transactional immunity to its witnesses
and refuse the same protection for defense witnesses), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967); United
States v. De Palma, 476 F. Supp. 775, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (prosecution's broad grant of immunity
for its witness and limited grant for defendant's witness resulted in unfair trial, therefore new trial
ordered), rev'don other grounds sub nom. United States v. Horwitz, 622 F.2d 1101, 1105-06 (2d Cir.
1980) (conceding it lacked authority to overturn lower court's grant of a new trial, court of appeals
disagreed with the district court's order excluding testimony by prosecution witnesses who had
received immunity unless the prosecution bestowed use immunity on defense witnesses).
In the second situation, the Third Circuit has held that the court itself can grant use immunity if
the defendant is otherwise "prevented from presenting exculpatory evidence which is crucial to his
case." Smith, 615 F.2d at 969. This situation is obviously much more relevant to Defendant's
plight than the first. If Defendant can meet the burden under Smith, he ordinarily will not need to
resort to trying to benefit from Witness' assertion of the fifth amendment: Witness will testify
instead. However, no defendant appears to have met the Smith burden, the most important compo-
nent of which is that he "make a convincing showing that.., the testimony [of the witness] is both
clearly exculpatory and essential to the defendant's case." Id. at 972; see United States v. Sampson,
661 F. Supp. 514, 521 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (none of witnesses for whom defendant sought immunity
would have exonerated him). If the defendant can meet that burden, the prosecution can nonethe-
less withhold immunity if its interests outweigh the defendant's. Smith, 615 F.2d at 973.
Other courts have rejected the judicial grant of immunity even when Witness' testimony is crucial
to Defendant's case. See United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1282-83 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (trial
court should not grant immunity to defense witnesses who are actual or potential targets of prosecu-
tion). Even if all courts agreed with Smith, however, the problem of Witness' assertion of the
privilege would not disappear for every Defendant. Smith leaves open the problem of drawing
inferences from Witness' assertion whenever the prosecution's interests in opposing immunity out-
weigh the Defendant's interests in granting it. Smith, 615 F.2d at 973.
14. E.g., United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 776-79 (2d Cir. 1980) (trial judge should "sum-
marily reject" requests for immunity when Witness is an actual or potential target of prosecution),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981). The military is the only jurisdiction that authorizes the judge
either to grant use immunity to a defense witness or to abate the proceedings for time to find an
alternate remedy. See RULES FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 704(e) (1984).
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the jury to speculate about Witness' guilt, the prosecution, one might predict,
would suddenly discover the value of granting use immunity to Witness.1 5 In
this circuitous way, then, juries would hear Witness testify.
Despite these benefits to the prosecution, every court that has considered
the issue has rebuffed Defendant's attempt to force Witness to invoke the
privilege before the jury. This rebuff is noteworthy in several ways. First,
Defendant's claim is not prosaic. Defendant not only proclaims his inno-
cence, but serves up the true (or at least an alternative) culprit.' 6
Second, Defendant's request to seek to benefit from Witness' privilege as-
sertion is quite modest in terms of constitutional and evidentiary law. He
seeks neither to strip a privilege from Witness, nor to topple a statute
designed to exclude supposedly unreliable evidence.' 7 In contrast to those
more breathtaking demands, he asks only that the court apply to the privi-
lege assertion the evidentiary tests of relevancy and prejudice that are used to
judge the admissibility of other evidence.' 8 And he asks the court not to use
the blunderbuss categorical rule that no litigant can benefit from the asser-
tion of any privilege by any witness.19
Third, because the prosecution has named Defendant as the culprit, its
opposition to Defendant's attempt to benefit seems unjustifiable-especially
when the prosecution believes only one person committed the crime. Also,
the prosecution can dismantle Witness' privilege by granting use immunity to
him, a power Defendant does not have.20 By granting use immunity to Wit-
ness, the prosecution can cross-examine him in advance of trial to extract the
information that Witness hides behind the privilege. With this information,
the prosecution can learn whether Witness' testimony would help or hurt
15. This point assumes that in testifying, Witness would help the prosecution rather than the
defense. For discussion of this important assumption, see infra note 104 and text beginning at note
102. If, however, Witness were suspected of having participated with Defendant in a multi-culprit
crime, the prosecution would worry that by granting Witness use immunity, it would increase its
difficulty in prosecuting him. See Turkish, 623 F.2d at 775; Flanaghan, supra note 10, at 456.
16. This distinguishes Defendant from other defendants who have sought to shift responsibility
to unidentified people. See People v. Mendez, 193 Cal. 39, 223 P. 65 (1924). In Mendez, the de-
fendant sought to show that several unidentified migrant workers, who had gone to Mexico after a
murder, had an altercation with the victim and thus a motive to kill him. The California Supreme
Court upheld excluding much of the defendant's evidence, noting that evidence of motive and
threats was inadmissible "unless coupled with other evidence tending to directly connect such other
person with the actual commission of the crime." Id. at 51, 223 P. at 70. Whether or not the
Mendez test is too rigorous, Defendant is in a different position, having identified and brought forth
the person (Witness) who may be guilty.
17. Cf Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967) (statute that declared codefendant in-
competent if called by defendant, on ground that codefendant's testimony would be untrustworthy,
held to violate sixth amendment's compulsory process clause).
18. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (relevancy), 403 (prejudice).
19. See PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 513 (1974). To overcome this rule is an impressive step.
20. The prosecution lacks an equivalent counter to all other privileges. The doctor, lawyer, or
priest who asserts the appropriate privilege stymies the prosecution as well as the defendant.
1989]
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Defendant. The prosecution can expose whether Witness and Defendant
have colluded in an effort to mislead the jury, or, conversely, can clear an
innocent defendant. In sum, by granting use immunity and assuming Wit-
ness' truthfulness, 21 we can avoid the two flaws of convicting an innocent
defendant or freeing a guilty defendant.
The state of the law in this area invites several observations about eviden-
tiary and constitutional law. Forbidding Defendant from trying to benefit
from Witness' assertion of the fifth amendment is an example of the choice
evidence law often makes: to exclude problematic evidence rather than to
search for ways to help the jury identify and understand estimation
problems. Although the import of Witness' privilege assertion is not pellu-
cid, the court could help the jury more than it does in the typical trial by
noting the inferences the jury might draw.22 Alternatively, as this article
suggests in Part V, the law might adopt a model of admissibility loosely
drawn from discovery rules. Under this model, Defendant (and perhaps any
party) could introduce any relevant evidence as long as he shared it with the
prosecution far enough in advance of trial to enable the prosecution to inves-
tigate. Finally, we need to ask whether Defendant's sixth amendment right
to compulsory process includes the right to try to profit from Witness' fifth
amendment privilege assertion. Arguably, the sixth amendment topples the
categorical rule that no litigant, not even the criminal defendant, can benefit
from the assertion of any privilege by any witness.
Efforts to restructure evidence law or to craft constitutional doctrine may
be unnecessary if courts have erred in interpreting the evidentiary rules of
various jurisdictions. Indeed, this article concludes that, at least in single-
culprit crimes, evidence law does not bar Defendant from attempting to con-
vince the jury that the privilege assertion inferentially supports Defendant's
claim of innocence. If Defendant is denied the ability to influence the jury in
this manner, the risk is great that the jury could convict a factually innocent
person. With multi-culprit crimes, in contrast, when Defendant does not seek
to substitute Witness for himself, there is reason to prevent Defendant from
trying to benefit from Witness' assertion.23
This article marches in the usual fashion. Part I introduces the topic more
thoroughly and examines why Defendant wants Witness to assert the fifth
amendment before the jury. Part II explores why courts have uniformly re-
fused to let Defendant try to benefit from Witness' assertion of the privilege.
Part III inspects two ways to reduce the possibility that the jury will misesti-
21. However, Witness has an incentive to lie about his complicity even if he has received immu-
nity. For more discussion, see infra text beginning at note 102.
22. See infra Part II.D.3.
23. The special problem is relevancy, discussed in Part II.c, infra.
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mate the significance of Witness' assertion. Part IV discusses constitutional
issues. Finally, Part V sketches a model for defendant-offered evidence.
I. INTRODUCTORY MATTERS
Before examining why courts refuse to let Defendant try to benefit from
Witness' assertion of the fifth amendment, we need to consider two prelimi-
nary matters. First, in what instances does Defendant want to call Witness?
Second, why does Defendant not share with the prosecution information sup-
porting his belief that Witness is the culprit?
A. WHEN DOES DEFENDANT WANT TO FORCE WITNESS TO ASSERT THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT BEFORE THE JURY?
Defendant wants to force Witness to assert the fifth amendment before the
jury in three situations. First, when the prosecution believes only one person
committed the crime, Defendant seeks to substitute Witness for himself as
the culprit. Second, when the prosecution believes two or more people com-
mitted the crime, Defendant claims that Witness (often a codefendant or an
alleged coparticipant) can exonerate Defendant or at least provide circum-
stantial evidence of his innocence or lesser culpability.24 Finally, when the
prosecution believes two or more people committed the crime, Defendant
claims that the codefendant (or an alleged coparticipant, if each one's sepa-
rate prosecution has not been joined) is alone responsible.
The leading example of the first situation is Bowles v. United States.25
Bowles was charged with murdering a soldier with a knife early in the morn-
ing of March 14, 1967.26 With no eyewitnesses and no physical evidence
yoking Bowles directly to the crime, the prosecution had scant evidence of
his guilt. A friend of Bowles' mother, however, testified that Bowles, while
visiting his mother after 8:00 p.m. on March 14, spontaneously admitted to
his mother and her friend that he had killed a soldier in the location where
the victim's body was found. Bowles also showed them the knife he said he
had used. Apart from this stark admission, Bowles apparently said nothing
more about the murder to his mother or her friend, neither identifying when
nor explaining why he had committed the crime.27
24. Cf Commonwealth v. Francis, 375 Mass. 211, 213, 375 N.E.2d 1221, 1223 (1978) (defendant
called Sarro, an alleged coparticipant, who had already been found guilty of burglary, claiming that
Sarro would testify that defendant joined Sarro only after the burglary; on this theory Sarro's testi-
mony would have made defendant guilty of the lesser charge of receiving stolen property).
25. 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971); see also Common-
wealth v. Sims, 513 Pa. 366, 521 A.2d 391 (1987) (defendant claimed prosecution witness, not he,
had killed victim).
26. Bowles, 439 F.2d at 538. The opinion does not indicate the time of death more precisely.
27. At trial Bowles debunked his confession, claiming he had not spoken "in earnest," but had
confessed "to take credit for a 'big deed.'" Id. at 544 n.8 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). His character-
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The prosecution reinforced Bowles' admission by showing that neither of
the other victims whose bodies had been found in alleys over the weekend of
March 14 were soldiers, and that both of those crimes had been solved.28
When arrested, five days after the murder, Bowles carried a knife with a
four-inch blade.29 The pathologist who performed the autopsy testified that
the fatal wound could have been caused by any knife with a five and one-half
inch blade.30
In his testimony, Bowles sought to shift responsibility to Raymond Smith.
Bowles stated that he met Smith, Neely, and another person at about 11:30
p.m. on March 13, approximately two blocks from where the soldier's body
was later found. He said that Smith bragged of killing a man moments ear-
lier and warned he would name Neely as the culprit if caught.31 In his testi-
mony, Neely confirmed Bowles' report of Smith's admission and threat. A
third defense witness, Royal, added that Smith asked him some time later
where he could find Neely. Apparently, Smith intended to threaten Neely
who, according to Smith, had breached Smith's order to tell no one of his
admission. No evidence suggested that either Neely or Royal had a reason to
testify falsely.
Smith, called by the defense as a witness during a hearing out of the pres-
ence of the jury, invoked the fifth amendment and refused to answer any
questions. The trial court refused to force Smith to assert the privilege in
front of the jury, ordered the attorneys not to mention in final argument why
Smith had not testified, and failed to explain to the jury why neither side had
called Smith to testify. The defense did not ask the prosecution to grant
immunity to Smith.
Any attempt to calculate the damage the defense suffered when the jury
ization is consistent with his report to the police that he had heard Raymond Smith admit to having
killed a man in the alley where the soldier's body Was found. Id. at 546 (Wright, J., dissenting).
Because Bowles told his mother, after her friend had left the room, that he had confessed in jest and
because he "joked a lot," his mother did not think he had told the truth. Id. at 544 n.8 (Bazelon,
C.J., dissenting).
28. The court of appeals did not mention another possible link between Bowles and the crime:
his description of the victim as a "soldier." Id. at 538 (majority opinion). Because the victim was
not wearing a uniform on the day he was killed, the killer would have had to learn his identity as a
soldier in some other way. Neither the majority nor dissenting opinions suggest how Bowles
learned, or could have learned, that the victim was a soldier.
29. The knife yielded no direct evidence, like bloodstains. Id. at 543 & n.3 (Bazelon, C.J., dissent-
ing). Also, there was no evidence indicating whether Bowles carried the knife on the day of the
crime. The friend of Bowles' mother was not asked whether the knife Bowles possessed when he
was arrested was the one he had shown them at the time he confessed.
30. Id. The length of the knife's blade would seem to disqualify it as the murder weapon. Hence,
although the majority wrestled with whether there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction,
its conclusion that the wound "could have been inflicted with a hard blow of the knife found on
[Bowles] at the time of his arrest" seems wrong. Id. at 538 (majority opinion).
31. Id. at 541. Why Smith would (or could) have implicated Neely remains unexplained.
[Vol. 78:1
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did not learn of Smith's refusal to testify is obviously futile, but the amount
of damage was probably not insignificant. After all, the prosecution's evi-
dence of Bowles' guilt was so underwhelming that two dissenters on the
court of appeals would have reversed on the ground of insufficient evidence. 32
The jury might have been deeply affected by the sharp contrast between
Bowles' willingness to testify and Smith's refusal to explain the evidence of
his guilt presented by Bowles. Indeed, Bowles not only lost the force of this
comparison, but he also might have appeared duplicitous to the jury if the
jury had expected Bowles to call Smith to testify after he had accused Smith
of responsibility. 33
The second situation, in which the prosecution believes that two or more
people committed the crime and Defendant claims that Witness (often a co-
defendant or an alleged coparticipant) would exonerate Defendant if each
were tried separately, is illustrated by United States v. Johnson.34 Along with
Hammond and Perry, Johnson was charged with selling cocaine to an under-
cover agent. Perry left the automobile where the purchase agreement was
struck to obtain the cocaine from one of his three suppliers. He returned
with the drugs ten minutes later, accompanied by Johnson. When the agent
told Johnson he need not enter the automobile, Johnson said, according to
the agent, "I always go where my stuff goes."35
Perry and Hammond, indicted with Johnson, pleaded guilty as the joint
trial of all three began. Johnson, now defending by himself, testified that he
was walking a dog when he met Perry, who asked him for help finding work.
Johnson admitted he accompanied Perry to a car but denied that he entered
it or said anything about his "stuff."'3 6 He sought to call Perry as a witness to
confirm his testimony. Perry, however, would not cooperate. He intended to
assert the fifth amendment, fearing that the prosecution might indict him for
conspiring with Johnson on this3 7 or other sales,38 or that the sentencing
judge might learn more about his involvement. 39
The third situation, in which one defendant accuses a codefendant (or al-
32. Id. at 546 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting); id. (Wright, J., dissenting).
33. Id. (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting) (to prevent the jury from reasoning in this way, the jury should
have been instructed that neither side could call Smith; failure to charge was plain error).
34. 488 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir. 1973).
35. Id. at 1208.
36. Id. at 1208-09.
37. Although the prosecutor said he did not intend to seek a conspiracy indictment, the prosecu-
tion had not promised this protection as part of the plea bargain. Id. at 1209 n.2. The court of
appeals thought the prosecutor might have lacked the authority to bind the prosecution not to
prosecute. Id.
38. Perry had already been sentenced for transferring cocaine on another occasion. If Johnson
had been his supplier, he might have feared being charged with Johnson for conspiracy in connec-
tion with that other transfer. Id. at 1209.
39. Id. at 1208.
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leged coparticipant) of sole responsibility, is illustrated by United States v.
Beye.40 Smith (the driver) and Beye (the passenger) were charged with pos-
sessing marijuana found by customs officials. The marijuana was discovered
in the door panels and under the back seat of Smith's automobile as Smith
and Beye returned from Mexico. In his opening statement, Smith's counsel
told the jury that Smith would testify that he knew nothing about the mari-
juana. In addition, Smith's counsel invited Beye's counsel to cross-examine
Smith "at great length,"'41 thereby encouraging the jury to infer that Beye
was solely responsible. After Smith's counsel finished, the trial judge de-
clared a mistrial as to Smith, severed Smith's prosecution from Beye's, and
continued the prosecution of Beye before the same jury that had heard
Smith's attorney's objectionable opening statement.42
Despite Smith's counsel's implied accusation of Beye, Beye claimed he did
not know the drugs were in the automobile. Beye said he had been apart
from Smith only once during their sojourn in Mexico and was able to corrob-
orate his claim that he had not obtained the drugs during that single, night-
time separation. Mimicking Smith's strategy, Beye sought to saddle Smith
with sole responsibility and called him to testify. However, Smith did not
cooperate. Smith's counsel said that Smith would assert the fifth amend-
ment, and the trial judge refused to let Beye force Smith to do so before
Beye's jury. A divided court of appeals agreed with this ruling, relying on
Bowles.43
In these three situations, Defendant hopes that the jury, if permitted to
watch Witness assert the fifth amendment, will infer that Witness' truthful
testimony would have supported Defendant's claim of innocence. In the first
and third situations, illustrated by Bowles and Beye, the reasoning is straight-
forward: Defendant accuses Witness of being the guilty party. In the second
situation, illustrated by Johnson, Defendant claims that by asserting the priv-
ilege, Witness admits knowing that Defendant is not guilty. Before examin-
40. 445 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); see also United States v. LaConture, 495 F.2d
1237, 1239 (5th Cir. 1974) (defendant wanted to force car's owner to assert fifth amendment before
jury to support defense that she knew nothing about drugs); United States v. De Luna, 308 F.2d
140, 142 (5th Cir. 1962) (discussed infra notes 190-96 and accompanying text).
41. Beye, 445 F.2d at 1040 (Ely, J., dissenting).
42. The court of appeals identified neither the party who had sought the mistrial nor the reason
why it was granted. The probable reason was the indirect, but nonetheless improper, comment by
Smith's counsel on Beye's exercise of his privilege to remain silent. The larger mystery is why the
trial judge continued the prosecution of Beye before the tainted jury. One would think that new and
separate juries should have adjudicated each defendant's guilt. Because Beye could not call Smith
to testify, Beye would want a different jury, untainted by Smith's counsel's implication of his guilt.
The prosecution would want Smith tried by a different jury, too, because otherwise it could not call
Beye to refute Smith's claim that Beye alone was guilty.
43. In dissent, Judge Ely noted that the panel was circulating draft opinions when Bowles was
decided. Id. at 1039. Rather than examining the fifth amendment issue extensively in its per
curiam opinion, the majority apparently chose summarily to rely on Bowles.
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ing why courts do not let Defendant try to use Witness' assertion to persuade
the jury of Defendant's innocence, it is useful to ask why the defense does not
share with the prosecution its evidence of Witness' guilt before the trial
begins.
B. WHY DOES DEFENDANT NOT TELL THE PROSECUTION
ABOUT WITNESS?
If Defendant cannot force Witness to assert the privilege before the jury,
why not share the evidence of Witness' guilt with the prosecution in the hope
that the prosecutor will dismiss the charges against Defendant?44 Despite
the attraction of a dismissal, defense counsel will hesitate to disclose for tacti-
cal reasons. 45 Surprise is always the defense's weapon, and is especially so in
this setting. By revealing the evidence of Witness' guilt at a tactically advan-
tageous time during Defendant's trial, defense counsel may derail the prose-
cution's case. The impact might be even greater if Defendant could try to
benefit from Witness' assertion. Although the prosecution can usually antici-
pate the locus and strength of a defendant's attack, and thus needs little time
to prepare to counter it, the prosecution may be startled by Witness'
appearance.
Defense counsel will also hesitate to disclose because the likelihood of con-
vincing the prosecution to dismiss the charges, although enticing, is small.
After all, the prosecution may dismiss the charges on its own initiative if it
lacks convincing evidence of Defendant's guilt.46 Although the defense has
information (some admissible as evidence, some not) implicating Witness,
the information will be less than that needed to prove Witness guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.47 With notice, the prosecution could investigate Wit-
ness' culpability, perhaps more thoroughly than the defense has (or could),48
44. When U.S. Attorneys decide that it is wrong to deny a defendant the testimony of a defense
witness who asserts the fifth amendment, they often dismiss the charge rather than grant immunity.
See Mykkeltvedt, United States v. Alessio-Due Process of Law and Federal Grants of Witness
Immunity for Defense Witnesses, 31 MERCER L. REV. 689, 693 (1980) (citing UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES RELATING TO USE OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS TO COMPEL
TESTIMONY OR PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION (Jan. 14, 1977)).
45. In none of the reported cases was defense counsel said to have notified the prosecutor about
Witness. Those defense attorneys faced with this problem with whom the author has spoken have
been tempted to disclose, but never have.
46. The prosecutor need have no more than probable cause to charge a defendant. See, e.g.,
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(a) (1983). Nonetheless, if the prosecutor
abhors losing cases-whether out of concern for wasting the resources of his office or for jeopardiz-
ing his position-he may demand much more convincing evidence. See Kaplan, The Prosecutorial-
Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 174, 184-85 (1965) (juries evaluate sufficiency of evi-
dence differently with different types of charges).
47. One exception might have been the witness McDonald in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
273 (1973). For a discussion of Chambers, see infra Part IV.A.
48. For example, the defense would have difficulty learning whether Witness refused to speak
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and could counter the defense evidence implicating Witness.49 Thus, disclo-
sure might actually damage the defense. Moreover, if the prosecution were
to speak with Witness (or his attorney), it might inveigle or force him to
testify (by granting use immunity).50 Defense counsel would fear that if Wit-
ness were to testify, he might falsely deny complicity.5 1 Although defense
counsel could pummel Witness' credibility by introducing evidence of Wit-
ness' guilt, the jury might be more likely to draw inferences in Defendant's
favor if Witness asserted the fifth amendment than if Defendant attacked
Witness' testimonial credibility.
For these tactical reasons, defense attorneys will not rush to tell the prose-
cutor about Witness unless they have such a combination of striking evidence
of Witness' sole complicity and convincing evidence of Defendant's inno-
cence that they think the prosecutor will dismiss the charges.5 2 This combi-
nation will not occur frequently.5 3 As discussed below, Defendant's failure
to disclose is not the hinge upon which courts have refused to let Defendant
try to benefit from Witness' assertion in single-culprit crimes.
Multi-culprit crimes must be distinguished from single-culprit crimes. In
multi-culprit crimes, procedural requirements prevent Defendant from bene-
because he was under investigation in connection with other crimes connected to the crime with
which Defendant was charged.
49. Of course, a prosecutor surprised by Witness' appearance probably could obtain a continu-
ance to investigate. Cf Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85 (1970) (not unconstitutional to grant
continuance to let prosecution investigate alibi).
50. Even if the prosecutor first learns of Witness during the trial, he still might grant use immu-
nity. Yet, the less time the prosecutor has for making this decision, perhaps the less likely it is that
he will offer use immunity. This is so because, with limited time, the prosecutor simply cannot
unravel whether Defendant or Witness is guilty.
51. Witness has an incentive to lie, in the hope of convincing the jury to convict Defendant. See
infra Part I.c.
52. Requiring the defense to disclose Witness' intent to invoke the privilege and evidence of
Witness' guilt makes sense only if Defendant can try to benefit from the assertion. The point is
explored in Part V, infra.
53. A professional responsibility issue lurks here if counsel has evidence of Witness' guilt but
does not believe that Witness is guilty (and that Defendant is innocent). When counsel cannot
suspend judgment (as defense attorneys so often do), the U.S. codes of professional conduct might
be stretched to forbid counsel from accusing Witness. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1979) ("assert[ing] a position [or] conduct[ing] a defense" is prohib-
ited only when "it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure
another"). In the United Kingdom the answer is clearer: the barrister cannot "attribute to another
person the crime with which his client is charged unless.., there are facts or circumstances which
reasonably suggest the possibility that the crime may have been committed by the person to whom
the guilt is imputed." SENATE OF THE INNS OF COURT AND THE BAR, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES % 146 (3d ed. 1985). Although no explanatory note accompa-
nies 11146, its injunction almost surely stems from the debate spurred by the ostensible attempt of
one defending barrister to shift responsibility from the defendant, who had confessed his guilt to the
barrister, to another, innocent person. For a discussion of this celebrated case, Queen v.
Courvoisier, 173 Eng. Rep. 869 (1840), see D. MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 192-
94 (1973).
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fitting from surprise. In joint trials, one defendant cannot call a codefendant
to testify.54 To obtain a severance from a codefendant, Defendant must es-
tablish that the codefendant would testify favorably for Defendant if he were
tried separately. These procedural nettles in multi-culprit crimes, coupled
with the more doubtful relevancy of drawing an inference in Defendant's
favor from a former codefendant's assertion of the fifth amendment, 55 sug-
gest that courts will (or should) let defendants in multi-culprit crimes try to
benefit from Witness' assertion less readily than defendants in single-culprit
crimes. Nonetheless, we need to examine the plight of defendants in each of
the Bowles, Beye, and Johnson situations.
II. WHY Is DEFENDANT PROHIBITED FROM ASKING THE JURY TO
DRAW INFERENCES IN HIS FAVOR FROM WITNESS' ASSERTION
OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT?
A. INTRODUCTION
Although courts have failed to defend extensively why Defendant cannot
try to benefit from Witness' assertion of the fifth amendment, their reasons
are clear.5 6 Most important are the evidentiary concerns of relevancy and
prejudice. Apart from Witness (and his counsel), no one knows why Witness
refuses to testify and what he hides. The jury will not learn Witness' motiva-
tions unless Witness receives immunity. Because a person can so easily assert
the fifth amendment, Witness may choose to assert it even if he has no infor-
mation that would implicate himself or exonerate Defendant.
Courts quickly slide from concern about relevancy to concern about preju-
dice. Even if Witness' assertion were relevant, the prosecution might suffer
evidentiary prejudice because the jury might overvalue the significance of the
assertion. Enhancing this concern is the prosecutor's inability to cross-ex-
amine Witness. Just as Witness' assertion bars Defendant from extracting
information he hopes would exculpate him, so it bars the prosecution from
54. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
55. See infra Part II.c.
56. There may be reasons that Witness should be forced to assert the privilege before the jury
even if Defendant is not allowed to benefit from that assertion. Whenever Witness has refused to
speak with the defense, defense counsel will not know to which specific questions Witness will assert
the privilege. Moreover, Witness' determination may crumble in the Witness stand and he may
decide to answer certain questions. These two reasons do not ordinarily justify testing Witness'
resolve before the jury, however, although others have disagreed. See United States v. Beye, 445
F.2d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 1971) (Ely, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Greene, 445 Pa. 228, 233-
34, 285 A.2d 865, 868 (1971) (Roberts, J., dissenting). Jurors, after watching Witness assert the
privilege, may be too tempted to reason the way the court instructs them they may not. Also, in a
hearing out of the jury's presence, the court can probe whether Witness may and whether he will
assert the privilege. See infra Part II.c.3.
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eliciting an explanation from Witness about the evidence that links him to
the crime and from probing for collusion between Witness and Defendant.
In addition to concerns with relevancy and prejudice, courts voice three
other reasons for not allowing Defendant to try to benefit from Witness' priv-
ilege assertion. First, Defendant and Witness may have colluded for Witness
to lie by claiming that if Witness testifies he might incriminate himself. Be-
cause the prosecution cannot cross-examine Witness, it cannot unmask such
an attempt to deceive the jury into inferring either that Witness is the true
culprit or that he would exonerate Defendant if he answered truthfully. Sec-
ond, courts hail symmetry as important: if the prosecution cannot ask the
jury to draw inferences against a defendant from a witness' assertion of the
fifth amendment, then neither should Defendant have the right to try to
profit from Witness' assertion. Finally, Witness' interest in not asserting the
privilege publicly might outweigh Defendant's interest in having him do so.
In the remainder of Part II, each reason is considered in turn; neither sin-
gly nor together do they convince. However, one preliminary matter re-
mains: what is the evidentiary status of Witness' assertion?
B. THE EVIDENTIARY STATUS OF WITNESS' PRIVILEGE ASSERTION
In our story, Witness parries defense counsel's questions by invoking the
fifth amendment. If the jury cannot treat a lawyer's argument or questions
as evidence, 57 in what way does Witness' response constitute "evidence"? 58
One answer to this question is to dispute the importance of the issue; a sec-
ond is to find parallels with other evidentiary doctrines which suggest that
the jury may be warranted in considering Witness' assertion.
Defendant could challenge the importance of the issue in two ways. First,
nothing turns on characterizing Witness' assertion as evidence or
nonevidence because Defendant has no burden of proof. In contrast, if the
prosecution sought to link Defendant with Witness through the latter's asser-
tion of the fifth amendment, the prosecution's proof burden would make it
important to characterize the evidentiary status of the assertion. Second, if
granted use immunity, Witness would have to testify. It seems unfair to let
the prosecution refuse to grant use immunity and simultaneously invoke a
technical evidentiary argument to defeat Defendant's attempt to capture
some value from Witness' appearance before the jury.59
57. Cf Brink's, Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700, 716 (2d Cir. 1983) (Winter, J., dissenting)
(assertion of fifth amendment by witness wrongly but "inevitably invites jurors to give evidentiary
weight to questions rather than answers").
58. See United States v. Atnip, 374 F.2d 720, 723 (7th Cir. 1967) ("There surely was a lack of
evidentiary value in a witness' refusal to answer questions under the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Such a refusal to testify does not have probative relevance on the issue of the defendant's guilt or
innocence.").
59. Cf Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle-The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 YALE
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Defendant, however, need not skirt the question of the evidentiary status
of Witness' assertion. Witness' assertion shares features with the refusal by a
party to testify or the failure of a party to counter an out-of-court accusation.
In those instances, a party's conduct has evidentiary importance in two ways.
First, although not literally "evidence," the party's conduct enhances the sig-
nificance of the evidence the party failed to counter. Second, the party's con-
duct is treated as an implied admission of the truth of the accusation, and
therefore effectively does constitute evidence.
Until Griffin v. California,60 a factfinder was not constitutionally prohib-
ited from drawing an inference against a criminal defendant from his refusal
to testify. Although not treated as evidence, that refusal gave the factfinder a
reason to credit whatever evidence of the defendant's guilt the defendant
could have refuted or explained. 61 Indeed, the prosecutor was permitted in
summation to identify the inferences the factfinder might draw.62 If, but for
Griffin, the defendant's refusal to testify might buttress the prosecution's evi-
dence, there seems to be no reason why Witness' assertion could not buttress
Defendant's attack on the prosecution's evidence.
The differences between the defendant's refusal to testify and Witness' re-
fusal to testify reinforce this conclusion. No one-not the court, the prosecu-
tor, nor a codefendant-can call the defendant to testify63 or force him to
explain why he will not testify.64 These protections that the fifth amendment
L.J. 1062, 1125 (1982) (factfinder in civil case might be allowed to consider defendant's assertion of
fifth amendment before trial for procedural reason that assertion might have impeded plaintiff's
discovery). The special significance of the prosecution's ability to use immunity to force Witness to
testify is considered in more detail infra text accompanying note 160.
60. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
61. The Supreme Court stated in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 0947), that refusal to
testify
does not involve any presumption, rebuttable or irrebuttable, either of guilt or of the truth
of any fact .... [However,] the court can direct the jury's attention to whatever evidence
there may be that a defendant could deny and the prosecution can argue as to inferences
that may be drawn from the accused's failure to testify.
Id. at 56. English courts treat the defendant's refusal to testify in the same way, although the
prosecution is prohibited from commenting. See ELEVENTH REPORT, supra note 1, 109-110, at
68-69.
62. See People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 450-53, 398 P.2d 753, 761-63, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 425-
27 (1965).
63. See United States v. Housing Foundation of America, 176 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 1949) (codefend-
ant cannot call defendant). But cf ELEVENTH REPORT, supra note 1, 1 110, 112, at 68-70 (pro-
posing to allow the judge in England to invite defendant to testify and to permit counsel for the
Crown (as well as the judge) to comment on defendant's declination). Those jurisdictions that,
before Griffln, permitted the prosecution to call the defendant as a witness conditioned that permis-
sion on proof by the prosecution of a prima facie case. See People v. Talle, 111 Cal. App. 2d 650,
245 P.2d 633 (1952); J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT § 2.061, at 49 & n.5 (1959).
64. The United Kingdom's Criminal Law Revision Committee seemed to assume that the de-
fending barrister could tell the jury any non-guilt-related reason why the defendant chose not to
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provides for a defendant contrast sharply with the protections it provides for
Witness. Witness can choose not to answer questions, but cannot refuse to
be asked. Also, the magic incantation that enables Witness to refuse to an-
swer is expressing the fear of self-incrimination. In contrast, because a de-
fendant cannot be asked questions, he need not concede that he will not
testify for fear of incriminating himself. There may be reasons a defendant
does not testify that are unrelated to his guilt.6 5 Thus, in a single-culprit
crime, Witness' assertion of the privilege may say as much (if not more)
about his guilt than a defendant's refusal to testify theoretically says about
his.
Forcing Witness to assert the privilege before the jury also shares features
with the evidentiary rule for adoptive admissions by a party. A party's fail-
ure to refute or explain an out-of-court accusation under circumstances in
which one would expect him to do so justifies inferring that he could not
refute or explain, and is treated as nonhearsay. 6 Witness is in the same posi-
tion as the person who may (fortuitously) become a party. In Defendant's
"prosecution" of Witness for a single-culprit crime, would we not expect
Witness to counter any evidence of his guilt that Defendant had amassed?
Moreover, a party, whose pretrial silence is treated as an admission whether
he testifies or not, might have had reasons not to speak that had nothing to
do with his negligence or culpability: he might have thought it was indelicate
or unwise to respond (for fear of upsetting the accuser), or he might have
wanted more time to craft a careful response. In contrast, once subpoenaed,
Witness has time to ponder whether to testify. Here too, then, the jury might
reason that Witness' assertion says more about his guilt than a party's silence
says about his.67 Hence, the position of Witness parallels rather closely that
testify, thereby softening somewhat the otherwise devastating impact of inviting the defendant to
testify and commenting on his refusal. See ELEVENTH REPORT, supra note 1, % 110, at 69.
65. See infra Part II.c.
66. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) & advisory committee's note; see also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425
U.S. 308, 319 (1976) (no difference between refusing to testify at trial and failing to deny a pretrial
accusation).
67. Cutting against this observation is the fact that because a party could always testify to ex-
plain his pretrial silence, there may be less reason to worry about the accuracy of drawing an
inference against him than there is about drawing an inference in favor of Defendant from Witness'
assertion. There are two responses to this concern. The first is to observe that the prosecution's
inability to cross-examine Witness deserves no special treatment because it is functionally no differ-
ent from any party's inability to cross-examine a declarant whose hearsay statement is admitted.
See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 233 comment, at 172 (1942). Second, the prosecution, un-
like a party who cannot directly challenge the hearsay statement from an unavailable declarant, can
always grant use immunity to Witness to force him to testify. The power to grant use immunity
might change the minds of those who, like Maguire, have opposed letting Defendant try to benefit.
Maguire posed the following hypothetical to show why no defendant should be permitted to try to
benefit from the assertion of the fifth amendment by someone else: A defendant, charged with the
statutory rape of a girl of "previously chaste character," sought to show that another man had,
during the defendant's preliminary examination, invoked the fifth amendment when asked whether
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of a party under the implied admission doctrine. 68
C. RELEVANCY
Although occasionally conceding that Witness' assertion carries a modi-
cum of force,69 courts nonetheless stamp it as irrelevant. Witness' assertion
lacks probative value, it is said, because absent a grant of use immunity, the
factfinder does not learn specifically why Witness fears self-incrimination. 70
It is true, of course, that even in a single-culprit crime the factfinder cannot
necessarily infer from Witness' assertion that Witness is guilty and Defend-
ant is not. People who are innocent may assert the privilege and probably do
so on occasion.71
Despite this uncertainty in reasoning about Witness' assertion,72 no court
using a relevancy test like that of rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
could find Witness' assertion irrelevant. Rule 401 marks as relevant evidence
that has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
he had sexual relations with the girl at a time before the defendant allegedly had done so. Maguire
believed that this defendant should not be permitted to show that the other man had invoked the
privilege because the prosecution could not effectively cross-examine that man. J. MAGUIRE, supra
note 63, § 2.061, at 55, 56. Actually, however, if the prosecution had granted use immunity it
would have eliminated all obstacles to effective cross-examination.
68. If these parallels are rejected and Witness' assertion is treated as "inarticulate hearsay," J.
MAGUIRE, supra note 63, § 2.061, at 56, Defendant faces an insuperable burden in finding a hearsay
exception through which to introduce Witness' assertion. The only exception that might apply is
that for penal interest statements by an unavailable declarant (as Witness would become by assert-
ing the privilege). See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). Defendant, however, could rarely satisfy the
unique trustworthiness test of that exception. Id. (statement tending to expose declarant to criminal
liability "not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of
the statement"). For a discussion of rule 804(b)(3), see Tague, Perils of the Rulemaking Process:
The Development, Application, and Unconstitutionality of Rule 804(b) (3)s Penal Interest Exception,
69 GEO. L.J. 851 (1981).
69. See Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc) ("In reality the
probative value of [Witness' fifth amendment assertion] is almost entirely undercut by the absence
of any requirement that the witness justify his fear of incrimination and by the fact that it is a form
of evidence not subject to cross-examination." (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
70. See People v. Thomas, 51 N.Y.2d 466, 472, 415 N.E.2d 931, 934, 434 N.Y.S.2d 941, 944
(1980) (fifth amendment assertion by witness whom defendant sought to substitute for himself as
sole culprit "does not, in and of itself, have any real probative significance").
71. Witness might fear his testimony would link him with Defendant in the commission of a
different crime. See Williams v. State, 600 P.2d 1092, 1093 (Alaska 1979). Or, the two might have
conspired for Witness to lie by saying he would incriminate himself. For more discussion of collu-
sion, see infra Part II.E.
72. Courts and commentators disagree about whether to draw an inference against a person
(criminal defendant, civil litigant, or witness) who asserts the fifth amendment. Compare Lakeside
v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 342 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[e]xperience... justifies the inference
that most people who remain silent in the face of serious accusation have something to hide and are
therefore probably guilty") and J. MAGUIRE, supra note 63, § 2.061, at 46 ("[s]uspicion springs
instantly from the claim of [the fifth amendment] privilege") with Slochower v. Board of Higher
Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1956) (innocent witness might assert fifth amendment for fear of being
"ensnared by ambiguous circumstances").
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quence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence."
In analogous settings, the factfinder may draw an inference against a party
in civil litigation73 and even against the criminal defendant 74 when either
refuses to testify or to adduce evidence. Even more instructive is the evolu-
tion of judicial thinking over whether to authorize the jury to infer the de-
fendant's guilt from his refusal to testify. As mentioned earlier, not until
1965 in Griffln v. California did the Supreme Court say that the Constitution
forbids the jury from inferring guilt from the defendant's silence 75 (as a Ca-
nadian jury may do76) or from hearing that it may draw an inference from
his silence 77 (as an English jury may hear7 8). As early as 1893, however, in
Wilson v. United States,79 the Supreme Court held that comment on the de-
fendant's refusal to testify would contravene a congressional statute that si-
multaneously gave defendants the right to testify and forbade the factfinder
from drawing an inference against a defendant who remained silent.80 While
not grounding its decision on the lack of relevancy of the defendant's refusal
73. An extreme example is a case in which the jury may draw an inference against the employer
from the assertion of the privilege by former employees over whom the employer has no control.
See Brink's, Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700, 707-10 (2d Cir. 1983). Even if the civil
litigation may lead to a criminal prosecution, the factfinder may draw an inference against the
defendant who does not testify. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316-20 (1976).
74. The factfinder may draw an inference against the criminal defendant who refuses on cross-
examination to answer questions related to his answers on direct examination, see United States v.
Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1338-44 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978);
who fails to adduce ostensibly favorable evidence within his control, see United States v. Viera, 839
F.2d 1113, 1116 (5th Cir. 1988); or who does not disclose exculpatory information to the police, but
discloses only at trial, see Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 235-41 (1980).
75. The Court had previously held that as a statutory matter, a federal jury could draw no infer-
ence. See Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939).
76. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 342 nn.47-48, 50 & 53 (citing cases indicating
that although judge cannot tell jury not to draw inferences against defendant, neither may judge
order jury not to draw inferences; the second instruction would be unfair to the Crown).
77. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113-14 (1908) (holding fourteenth amendment's due
process clause does not include fifth amendment; Court declined to decide whether fifth amendment
forbade the prosecutorial comment that New Jersey had authorized).
Indeed, until Griffin the Court consistently held that the states could force the defendant to
testify. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947) ("[f]or a state to require testimony from
an accused is not necessarily a breach of a state's obligation to give a fair trial").
78. Although the English statute authorizing the defendant to testify forbade the prosecution
from commenting on his decision not to testify, Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., ch. 36,
§ l(b), the statute was quickly interpreted not to bar comment by the judge. See The Queen v.
Rhodes [1899] 1 Q.B. 77 (1898). To balance any adverse comment, the judge is required to note that
the defendant need not testify and that reasonable inferences may be drawn from his silence other
than that the defendant is guilty. See J. ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE PRACTICE IN CRIMI-
NAL CASES § 4-431, at 496 (42nd ed. 1985).
79. 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
80. Id. at 65-70 (interpreting Act of Mar. 16, 1878, Ch. 37, 20 Stat. 30 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3481 (1982)).
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to testify, the Court defended Congress' choice in a way that smacked of a
relevancy analysis. It noted that "[e]xcessive timidity [and] nervousness
when facing others [while] attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious
character" might so "confuse and embarrass" the defendant that, even if in-
nocent, he would decline to testify.8
The Court's image of a befuddled, cowering defendant seems quaint,
parentalistic, and unconvincing.82 Of those defendants who do not testify,
the bulk remain silent, one suspects, because they would condemn them-
selves by testifying truthfully. Nonetheless, there are cogent reasons for an
innocent defendant not to testify, whether or not he is poised and articulate.
He can hide from the jury his commission of other dreadful crimes only at
the cost of not testifying. 83 The defendant may prefer to present his defense
through other witnesses, with whose memories he disagrees sufficiently to
worry about revealing those inconsistencies through his testimony.84 Finally,
the defendant may worry that his testimony would lead the jury to ignore the
burden of proof, and do no more than compare his story and credibility with
that of the prosecution's witnesses.85
Despite these understandable reasons why the defendant would not tes-
81. Id. at 66. In England, too, the refusal before 1898 to permit the defendant to testify had been
defended as necessary to protect the defendant from gestural quirks, halting speech, or a demon-
strated lack of acuity that would discredit his truthful testimony. See G. WILLIAMS, THE PROOF
OF GUILT 47 (3d ed. 1963) (discussing debate before enactment of Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61
& 62 Vict., ch. 36).
82. Although no historical link apparently exists, might this image of the innocent defendant
have been crafted to counter Bentham's savage criticism of the privilege not to testify as "the very
first" rule criminals would "establish[ ] for their security"? Id. at 53 (quoting Bentham). Or, might
the Court in Wilson have described defendants in this way because, without the right to appointed
counsel, indigent defendants would have no one to help them prepare their testimony?
83. The prosecution, however, might be able to introduce evidence of his earlier criminal conduct
as substantive evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
In deciding whether to testify, a defendant in England is not burdened by an atrocious criminal
record in the way a defendant in America usually is. The defendant in England can be impeached
by being forced to reveal his commission of other crimes only if he introduces evidence of his own
good character or attacks the character of a witness called by the Crown. See Criminal Evidence
Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., ch. 36 § l(f). Hence, with less to risk, the defendant in England has more
reason to testify. Perhaps this explains why in England the jury may draw inferences against the
defendant from his decision not to testify. Earlier American evidence codes argued for the same
exchange: the jury could draw inferences against a defendant who did not testify, but, in testifying,
the defendant had to reveal his criminal record only if he introduced evidence of his credibility. See
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rules 106(3), 233 (1942); UNIFORM RULES OF EVID. 21, 23(4) (1953).
84. Perhaps this tactical opportunity should be eliminated by requiring the defendant to testify
first or not at all, as England has done. See Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 60, § 79
(accused must testify first unless court decides otherwise); Lord Justice Davies v. Smith, 52 Crim.
App. 224, 225 (1968) (correct practice is for accused to give evidence before other witnesses). In
Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), however, the Court struck down a state statute that
barred the defendant from testifying unless he was the first defense witness.
85. Or, the defendant might be able to deny or explain certain incriminating evidence but not all
of it. See J. MAGUIRE, supra note 63, § 2.061, at 52.
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tify,8 6 no one argues that his decision to remain mute is irrelevant.8 7 Defend-
ants were granted the right to testify in the latter part of the nineteenth
century when jurisdictions decided that it was wrong to prevent innocent
defendants from trying to counter the prosecution's evidence. 88 Courts as-
sumed that an innocent defendant, once permitted to testify, would scramble
to the witness stand to exonerate himself.8 9 By not testifying, the defendant
impliedly signaled his guilt,90 and the jury could therefore infer guilt from his
silence. 91 The right to testify, then, became a trap for the guilty defendant. 92
The guilty defendant had to choose how to suffer: risk that the jury would
infer guilt if he did not testify, risk damning himself if he testified truthfully,
or risk being charged with perjury if he testified falsely.93 Before Griffin, the
Supreme Court offered no constitutional help to the defendant, whether
guilty or innocent, who chose not to testify.94 The due process command
that any conviction had to be based on credible evidence was not undercut if
the prosecutor or the judge commented on the defendant's refusal to testify,
or if the jury, whether or not aided by comment, drew an inference against
86. Of course, none of these reasons would explain why Witness asserts the fifth amendment.
87. We might, as a result, require the defendant to explain why he chose not to testify, as a
condition of barring judicial comment. In this way we would consider each defendant, not defend-
ants as a class.
88. Maine was the first state to let the criminal defendant testify. See Act of March 25, 1864,
Me. Laws ch. 280, at 214 (codified as amended at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1315 (1964));
State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298, 300 (1871); 8 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE § 2272(a), at 421 (3d ed. 1940).
89. See Cleaves, 59 Me. at 300.
90. Id.
91. One court thought the defendant, whether innocent or guilty, should not testify because ju-
ries would not believe him. State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 554, 565-66 (1868) ("The very fact that he
testifies as if with a halter about his neck... is enough to usually deprive his testimony of all weight
in his favor, whether it be true or false .... [T]he true application of the statute [permitting the
defendant to testify] is only to those rare cases, when a word from the prisoner, and him only, will
manifestly dispose of what otherwise seems conclusive against him.").
92. The prohibition against testifying had helped guilty defendants. Defense counsel could as-
sure the jury that "were his client's mouth not shut he might [have been] able to put an entirely
different complexion upon the evidence adduced against him." Barry, A Note on the Prisoners
Right to Give Evidence in Victoria, 6 REs JUDICATAE 60, 62 (1952) (footnote omitted) (citing sum-
mation given by a barrister at a time before the defendant could testify). Preventing the barrister
from making this sort of argument when he knew (or supposedly knew) that the defendant was
guilty might be one reason behind England's adoption of the rule that a barrister may not claim the
defendant is innocent if he knows otherwise. See supra note 53.
93. This predicament did not bother everyone. See Cleaves, 59 Me. at 301 ("The embarrassment
of the prisoner, if embarrassed, is the result of his own previous misconduct, not of the law.").
94. Many states, however, beginning with Massachusetts in 1866, forbade comment on the de-
fendant's refusal to testify and forbade the jury to draw an inference against the defendant. Even
Maine changed its position by statute in 1879. For the history of state legislation prohibiting com-
ment, see Reeder, Comment Upon Failure ofAccused to Testify, 31 MICH. L. REV. 40, 41-44 (1932).
By the 1950s, six states still permitted comment or let the jury draw an inference. See Noonan,
Inferences from the Invocation of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 41 VA. L. REV. 311, 338
(1955) (California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, Ohio, and Vermont).
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the defendant from that decision. 95
In Griffin, the Supreme Court conceded that the defendant's refusal to
testify was relevant to assessing his guilt.96 Like those states that had earlier
forbidden the jury to draw an inference from the defendant's silence,97 how-
ever, the Court thought that comment by the prosecutor would wrongly pe-
nalize the defendant's exercise of a constitutional right.98
The discussion so far has involved drawing an inference against a criminal
defendant or a party in civil litigation. Why, if it is relevant to draw an
inference in the prosecution's favor when a defendant refuses to testify, is it
irrelevant to draw an inference in Defendant's favor when Witness asserts the
fifth amendment? Courts have refused to allow Defendant to benefit because,
in part, Witness can so easily meet the test to assert the fifth amendment.
The ease with which the assertion can be made has led courts not to examine
studiously on a case-by-case basis the reasons that Witness might choose not
to testify.
A witness can invoke the fifth amendment if an answer might provide a
"link in the chain of evidence" that would be useful in prosecuting him.99
Just as a defendant can refuse to be questioned, so a witness can refuse to
answer, even when he knows he is innocent. Courts readily defer to the wit-
ness who frets that he risks incriminating himself, on instruction from the
Supreme Court not to reject the privilege claim unless it is "perfectly clear"
that the witness would risk nothing by answering.100 Although there is no
95. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 57-58 (1947). Concurring, Justice Frankfurter scof-
fed at the relevancy objection:
Sensible and just-minded men, in important affairs of life, deem it significant that a man
remains silent when confronted with serious and responsible evidence against himself
which it is within his power to contradict. The notion that to allow jurors to do that
which sensible and right-minded men do every day violates the "immutable principles of
justice" as conceived by a civilized society is to trivialize the importance of "due process."
Id. at 60 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The defendant's failure to testify was compared with the
hearsay exception for a party's failure to have countered a pretrial accusation. See Parker v. State,
61 N.J.L. 308, 313-14, 39 A. 651, 653-54 (1898).
96. After paraphrasing Justice Frankfurter's evaluation of the privilege assertion in Adamson,
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, said: "What the jury may infer, given no help from the
court, is one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into
evidence against him is quite another." Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
The Court did not explain whether the defendant's silence was itself evidence or instead provided
support for the prosecution's other evidence. See supra Part I.B.
97. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 88, § 2272, at 412 n.2 (listing cases). F6r those states that
permitted comment or inference, see supra note 94.
98. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613-15.
99. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) (citation omitted).
100. Id. at 488. The test was not always so generous. See Noonan, supra note 94, at 322 n.63
(tracing evolution of privilege's protections to Hoffman, from earlier interpretations of facts that
were elements of a crime, or facts that would provide clues to criminal conduct). Those who fought
disclosing subpoenaed documents on the ground of self-incrimination once had to give the docu-
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model for courts to follow in deciding whether to let the witness remain si-
lent, courts must determine if the witness will assert the fifth amendment
privilege and whether he may properly do so. In making this determination,
courts often shrink from forcing a witness to identify precisely the risk he
believes he might run by answering, demanding no more than that the wit-
ness (through his attorney) adumbrate the risk the witness would run. 10 1
Were courts to inspect closely the facts of the case, they could identify the
inferences a rational juror might draw from Witness' privilege assertion. 10 2
They would see that the reasons that might impel an innocent defendant to
remain silent do not apply to Witness. The circumstances in which Defend-
ant calls Witness to testify are not ambiguous. Witness doubtlessly realizes,
at least in a single-culprit crime, that he might one day be prosecuted if De-
fendant is acquitted. 10 3 The critical factual assumption is that self-interest
impels Witness to testify, at least in a single-culprit crime, that he is inno-
cent. Because the prosecution has selected Defendant as its candidate for the
culprit, Witness risks prosecution only if Defendant is acquitted. Witness
can help himself only by testifying. If innocent, Witness can truthfully ex-
plain why Defendant's evidence of Witness' guilt either does not exist or does
not support the inference Defendant desperately wants the jury to draw. If
ments to the court for an in camera inspection of the merits of the claim. See Brown v. United
States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928). Were the witness to carry the burden of demonstrating the risk, courts
would probably compel more witnesses to testify. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 139 (3d. ed 1984).
101. Typically, the court expects the witness only to
allude in very general, circumstantial terms to the reasons why he feels he might be in-
criminated by answering a given question. The judge examines him only far enough to
determine whether there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his
being compelled to answer. If the danger might exist, the court must uphold the privilege
without requiring the witness to demonstrate that a response would incriminate him, the
latter inquiry being barred by the privilege itself.
United States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1046 (5th Cir. 1976) (emphasis in original).
102. In a related area, the Supreme Court has vacillated in considering the relevancy of a defend-
ant's silence before and after he has received the Miranda warnings. Once the Court thought the
defendant's silence at arrest, even without the warnings, might be "inherently ambiguous." Doyle
v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 n.8 (1976). More recently, however, the Court has said the state could
impeach the defendant with his post-arrest silence as long as he had not been given the Miranda
warnings. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (per curiam).
103. In other contexts, like a congressional committee inquiry or a grand jury investigation, the
subpoenaed witness may not know the subject matter of the investigation or the role the body
suspects he might have played. Consequently, the witness might understandably assert the fifth
amendment. See E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 29-30 (1955) (congressional
committee inquiry). In such cases, no inference can be drawn against him from the assertion. See
United States v. Grunewald, 353 U.S. 391, 421 (1957). U.S. Attorneys are instructed, however, to
inform a person subpoenaed to testify whether he is considered a "witness" (no criminal exposure),
a "subject" (possible exposure), or a "target" (exposure). DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES AT-
TORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-11,250 (1979).
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guilty, Witness has an incentive to lie to contest the evidence of his guilt.104
Although not quite a zero-sum game,10 5 Witness wins if Defendant loses. As
a consequence, when Witness pleads the fifth amendment, one inference is
ineluctable: Witness is guilty, and refuses to lie about his guilt to seal De-
fendant's conviction.
Chambers v. Mississippi10 6 illustrates this factual assumption. Chambers,
charged with murdering a police officer as a crowd fought to prevent the
officer from arresting another man, sought to shift responsibility to McDon-
ald. On four occasions, McDonald had confessed to having killed the officer,
including a sworn confession that he had given to Chambers' attorneys. Mc-
Donald had admitted shooting the officer, fleeing after the crime, and jet-
tisoning the gun (the same type as the murder weapon) that McDonald
admitted he had used. Indeed, the evidence of McDonald's guilt was so
strong that he had once been charged with the crime. A court had dismissed
that charge at McDonald's preliminary hearing after he repudiated the con-
fession he had given to Chambers' attorneys. He claimed he had falsely con-
fessed based on the assurance of a Reverend Stokes that McDonald would
share in the booty that Chambers would recover from a lawsuit Chambers
would file against the city.10 7
The defense called McDonald to testify at Chambers' trial. McDonald
again repudiated the confession he had given to Chamber's attorneys and
explained that he had connived to confess.10 8 Our reason for reviewing
Chambers here is not to consider how a jury might have evaluated McDon-
ald's testimony. Rather, it is to suggest that McDonald acted as one would
have expected a guilty (or innocent) person to do if accused of having com-
104. If this assumption is correct, one might expect the prosecution to begin to. grant use immu-
nity to Witness if courts allowed the jury to draw an inference in Defendant's favor from Witness'
refusal to testify. With use immunity, Witness would be emboldened to tell the truth if he were
innocent or to lie if he were guilty, because the risk of being prosecuted for peijury would be small.
Defendant might therefore prefer to have Witness assert the fifth amendment rather than testify
under a grant of use immunity. Defendant risks less if Witness asserts the privilege, even if Defend-
ant would achieve more if Witness were to testify truthfully that he rather than Defendant was
solely responsible. Of course, Defendant's risk assessment should not control whether Witness as-
serts the fifth amendment or is ordered to testify. The prosecution should have the choice of impos-
ing use immunity on Witness or risking inferences against it from Witness' privilege assertion.
105. Even if Defendant were acquitted, the prosecution might not prosecute Witness for the
same crime.
106. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). In Chambers, the Supreme Court held for the first time that the due
process clause overrides state evidentiary exclusionary rules to justify introducing hearsay offered
by the defense. Id. at 302-03.
107. McDonald claimed that Reverend Stokes had persuaded him to speak with Chambers' at-
torneys. Id. at 291. The Court did not elaborate on the details of this alleged scam.
108. McDonald must have intended to imply that the connivance involved Chambers, too,
although the Court does not say so. The possibility of collusion between defendants and witnesses
like Chambers and McDonald worried the State, id. at 301 n.21, and today, continues to worry
courts, see infra Part II.E.
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mitted the crime with which Defendant was charged. McDonald could bet-
ter protect himself by testifying than by asserting the fifth amendment. Had
he remained silent, the State might have resurrected its prosecution of him if
Chambers had been acquitted. Of course, McDonald might have testified
truthfully in denying his guilt and explaining why he had confessed. But,
regardless of the truthfulness of his testimony, his interest lay in helping to
convince the jury to convict Chambers. Had he asserted the fifth amend-
ment, McDonald might have worried that Chamber's jury would have
thought his refusal to repudiate or explain his confession supported Cham-
bers' accusation.
Let us return to Bowles, Johnson, and Beye, our illustrations of the three
situations in which Defendant seeks to call Witness. Why, in each of those
cases, might Witness have decided not to testify? Recall that in Bowles, the
defendant sought to shift blame for the murder from himself to Smith (Wit-
ness). One can imagine the type of accusatory questions Bowles' attorney
would have hurled at Smith concerning his purported connection to the
crime, had Smith appeared before the jury. Among the questions might have
been the following:
"At (place) and (time) did you tell Neely and Bowles that you had just
killed a man?"
"Did Neely lie in reporting that you had said you murdered the soldier?"
"On (the date of the murder), did you own a knife that had a blade of five
inches or so?"
"Were you in the alley where the victim's body was found around (the
time of the murder)?"
"You killed the man whom Defendant is charged with having
murdered?" 10 9
109. Leading questions such as these may help the jury better understand the relevancy of Wit-
ness' assertion. They also fit better with the view that Witness' assertion of the fifth amendment
privilege resembles an implied admission. See supra Part II.B. But there are two problems with
leading questions. First, the jury may be unduly influenced by counsel's provocative language and
accusatory tone. Orchestrating Witness' appearance before the jury might ameliorate this problem.
See infra Part II.c.3. Second, as long as counsel believes that Witness will assert the privilege to any
question, counsel can fashion questions that assume the existence of certain evidence when counsel
has no basis to believe that such evidence exists. This seems unfair. Counsel could therefore be
required to have some, perhaps even a reasonable, basis to believe Witness would confirm the exist-
ence of the evidence if he were to testify truthfully. Cf. Commonwealth v. Sims, 531 Pa. 366, 379,
521 A.2d 391, 397 (1987) (Hutchinson, J., concurring) (as a condition of allowing the defendant to
force a prosecution witness to assert the attorney-client privilege before the jury, defense counsel
must have a "reasonable belief that a material privileged discussion took place before cross-examin-
ing a witness on communications with that witness's attorney").
Under that requirement, defense counsel in Bowles could have asked Smith whether Smith told
Neely, Bowles, and a third person that he had killed someone; Neely could be called to testify that
Smith had made this admission. In contrast, if counsel had no information that Smith owned a
knife of the type that could have inflicted the wound, he could not have asked about such a knife
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With questions as focused as these, neither Witness nor the jury could
mistake the possible explanations for Witness' refusal to answer. Three infer-
ences are plausible. First, Smith was guilty and Bowles was not. Second,
Smith and Bowles colluded for Smith to lie in claiming that he risked incrim-
inating himself, in the hope that the jury would erroneously infer Smith's
guilt and Defendant's innocence. Finally, Smith might have feared that by
admitting the existence of circumstantial evidence of his guilt-say, that he
carried a knife that could have been the murder weapon, or that he had been
in the alley where the victim was murdered-the state could prosecute him,
even though he was innocent, if the jury acquitted Defendant or if the prose-
cution believed he was a coparticipant. 110
To believe that Smith's assertion is irrelevant is to use a relevancy test
different from that of rule 401, or to use relevancy as a mask for other policy
objectives. In Bowles, the first inference would support Defendant's claim
that Smith, not Bowles, was the true culprit. The third inference would also
support this defense if the jury inferred that Smith had a knife like the mur-
der weapon, was in the alley, and so on-all circumstantial evidence from
which the jury might decide that Smith was the culprit or, equally important
for Bowles, that the prosecution had not met its burden of proving Bowles'
guilt. In drawing either inference, then, a juror could reasonably reevaluate
the evidence of Defendant's (and of Witness') guilt. The second inference-
that Smith and Bowles had colluded-would also encourage a juror to reas-
sess the other evidence. This time, of course, by inferring that the two had
colluded, the juror could infer that Bowles was guilty.
In multi-culprit crimes, in contrast, the relevancy to Defendant's guilt of
the assertion of the privilege by a former codefendant or a suspected copar-
ticipant is somewhat problematic. If in a single-culprit crime like Bowles we
can assume that Witness could best protect himself by testifying, then in
cases like Beye and Johnson the reverse is true: Witness can protect himself
in most instances by asserting the privilege. Nonetheless, the assertion is
arguably still relevant, although the jury would doubtlessly discount its sig-
nificance, if not dismiss it altogether.
Recall that in Beye, the defendant (Beye) argued that Smith (his former
codefendant whose case had been severed) had alone possessed the marijuana
(another advantage of such a good faith test is that it might spur defense counsel into conducting
more factual investigations). On the other hand, Smith, by answering that he did not own such a
knife, would not have incriminated himself (assuming his answer was truthful), and he would not
have waived his fifth amendment right not to answer the other questions about the crime. Hence,
why would Smith refuse to say he did not own a weapon that could have been the murder weapon
unless he in fact did own such a weapon?
110. In this third possibility, Witness still could answer truthfully that he had not killed the
victim. Whether by answering that ultimate question Witness might be held to have waived the
privilege not to answer more detailed questions is difficult to say.
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found inside Smith's car. Supporting that claim was Smith's assertion of the
privilege when called to testify by Beye. A divided court of appeals, without
discussing the issues and relying exclusively upon Bowles (which had recently
been decided), held that Beye could not try to benefit from Smith's asser-
tion."II In dissent, Judge Ely identified four inferences that could be drawn
from Smith's assertion. 112 If guilty, Smith had reason to assert the privilege
whether he had acted by himself or with another person and whether that
second person was Beye or someone else. If innocent, Smith might also have
asserted the privilege whether or not he knew of Beye's guilt, for fear that in
testifying he might reveal circumstantial evidence linking him to Beye or to
the crime.1 13 Because two of these inferences supported Beye's claim of inno-
cence, Judge Ely argued that the assertion was relevant and the trial court
should have forced Smith to assert the privilege before Beye's jury." 4
Smith's assertion is relevant, but its relevancy is exceedingly marginal. It
is marginal because self interest could impel any codefendant or suspected
coparticipant, whether guilty or not, to assert the privilege." 5 For such a
person to testify to exonerate another borders on a supererogatory act. If
guilty, the codefendant (Witness) would necessarily provide evidence of his
guilt in exonerating Defendant. Even if innocent, Witness would fear re-
vealing evidence that might be useful in prosecuting him." 6 After all, for his
testimony to help Defendant, he must know something about the crime and
Defendant's complicity. Moreover, by testifying, Witness would lock himself
into that version of the facts, a version he could change only at the risk of
111. 445 F.2d 1037, 1038 (9th Cir. 1971).
112. Id. at 1042-43 (Ely, J., dissenting).
113. Id. Two other inferences could also be drawn. First, the defendants might have colluded
for Smith to invoke the privilege in the hope of misleading the jury into thinking that Smith alone
was guilty, when either he was not guilty or both he and Beye were guilty. For more discussion of
the possibility of collusion, see infra Part II.E.. Second, Smith might have asserted the privilege for
fear of disclosing the commission of a separate crime, say of using the car to smuggle drugs on
another occasion.
114. 445 F.2d at 1042-43 (Ely, J., dissenting). Indeed, Judge Ely thought the trial judge should
have forced Smith to appear before the jury to test his resolve in asserting the privilege. Id. at 1041.
This seems unnecessary. The trial judge can determine Smith's resolve in a way less likely to tempt
the jury to draw the forbidden inference. See infra Part II.D.3. The court should not let Witness
appear before the jury if it finds that Witness will assert the privilege and if it will not allow Defend.
ant to benefit from the assertion.
115. Evidence is irrelevant if it is as likely to exist whether or not the proposition for which it is
offered is true. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 159 (2d ed,
1982).
116. Because the prosecution usually controls the order of prosecution (at least in jurisdictions
with master calendars), a defendant who succeeds in the difficult task of obtaining a severance may
nonetheless fail to persuade his former codefendant to testify if the latter's prosecution has not
ended. The prosecution could even use its control as a tactical matter to ensure that the former
codefendant would refuse to testify. For an argument that a defendant has a constitutional right to
severance to call a former codefendant, see Westen, supra note 10, at 145-46.
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being impeached in his own prosecution or of being charged with perjury. 117
At the least, he would provide the prosecution with the unusual opportunity
to investigate the truth of what he said he had done and knew.
A former codefendant would equally hesitate to testify if he had been con-
victed or acquitted by the time he was called by Defendant to testify. A
convicted defendant who protests his innocence might worry about disclos-
ing information that would be useful in reprosecuting him were he successful
in overturning his conviction on appeal.1 " A defendant who pleaded guilty,
like one of the codefendants in Johnson, might nonetheless invoke the privi-
lege for fear of being prosecuted for conspiracy, for another drug sale, 119 or
by another jurisdiction (in that case, by the State). 20
In summary, in a single-culprit crime like Bowles, Witness has an interest
in testifying rather than in asserting the fifth amendment (unless, of course,
he is guilty and does not want to lie in denying complicity). Witness will
escape prosecution as long as Defendant is convicted. He has an incentive to
testify to counter whatever evidence of his sole guilt Defendant has gathered.
In contrast, codefendants like Smith in Beye and Perry in Johnson have an
incentive to invoke the privilege even if they feel impelled to help a defendant
whom they know is innocent. By testifying, they increase, not decrease, their
risk of being prosecuted and convicted. Thus, invoking the privilege in a case
like Bowles is relevant; doing so in cases like Beye and Johnson is at best
marginally relevant.121 As a result, from this point we will focus principally
117. Because Witness' counsel may not know whether his client is guilty or innocent (or at least
how a jury would regard the evidence of guilt), counsel will probably stress this reason in trying to
convince his client to assert the privilege.
118. Courts have taken different positions about when a convicted defendant's fifth amendment
privilege ends concerning that conviction. For a review of the various positions, see Ellison v. State,
65 Md. App. 321, 329-31, 500 A.2d 650, 654-56 (1985), aff'd, 310 Md. 277, 528 A.2d 1271 (1987).
119. Because Perry had told the agent he had three sources of narcotics, the court of appeals
thought he might have worried he would disclose other drug transactions, especially on cross-exam-
ination. United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1209 (lst Cir. 1973). The court of appeals could
speculate with freedom because Johnson's attorney had neither pinpointed the subjects nor revealed
the questions he wanted to ask. Had Johnson's attorney restricted his and the prosecutor's ques-
tions to the sale with which Johnson was charged, one wonders whether Perry should have been
ordered to testify. The prosecutor promised not to charge conspiracy. Even if that promise did not
bind the prosecution, as the court of appeals doubted that it did, id. at 1209 n.2, the prosecution still
could not have used Perry's compelled testimony in prosecuting him for conspiracy. Cf PROPOSED
FED. R. EvID. 511 (1974) (no waiver of privilege when testimony is erroneously compelled).
120. In contrast, without permission from the Attorney General, federal prosecutors do not pros-
ecute a person who has been successfully prosecuted by a state for substantially the same acts that
sparked federal interest. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 531 (1960) (per curiam).
121. Nonetheless, in the converse setting, in which the prosecution wants the jury to draw an
inference against the defendant from an alleged accomplice's assertion of the fifth amendment privi-
lege to questions designed to tie him and the defendant to the crime, courts have not found that
assertion to be irrelevant. See United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1959) ("[s]uch
refusals to testify [by witnesses who allegedly participated with the defendant] have been uniformly
held not to be a permissible basis for inferring what would have been the answer, although logically
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upon the plight of Defendant in a single-culprit crime.
D. EVIDENTIARY PREJUDICE
Even after holding that Witness' privilege assertion is irrelevant, courts
hurry to add that letting Defendant try to benefit would unfairly prejudice
the prosecution. Judicial analysis of the prejudice the prosecution allegedly
would suffer has been summary and unsatisfactory. Rather than closely in-
specting the facts of the case, courts posit that the prosecution will suffer
because the jury will surely overestimate the significance of Witness' privilege
assertion. Witness need not spell out why he fears incriminating himself and
(without granting use immunity) the prosecution cannot cross-examine him
to extract the information he fights to keep hidden. By ruling in this sum-
mary manner, courts have not needed to consider a third possible source of
misestimation by the jury-careful orchestration of Witness' appearance
before the jury. 122
Were courts to apply Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the rule concerning
evidentiary prejudice, they could not find prejudice so easily.' 23 Rule 403
authorizes, but does not require, the judge to exclude relevant evidence of
which the "probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of un-
fair prejudice.., or misleading the jury, or by [the] consideration[ ] of...
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 124 After estimating the pro-
bative value of the evidence to the proponent and the probable harm to the
opponent, the judge must determine whether the harm substantially out-
weighs the benefit. With this three-step test, rule 403 roots the determination
of evidentiary prejudice in the facts of the case. The analysis is quintessen-
tially discretionary and ad hoc. Under rule 403, then, courts would err in
excluding Witness' assertion by using, as they have, a generalization about
fact (juries will overvalue the assertion) or a categorical rule (the prosecution
cannot cross-examine Witness). 125 By placing the burden of persuasion on
the opponent, rule 403 also slants the inquiry toward admitting rather than
excluding evidence. Indeed, this slant implies that the court should search
they are very persuasive"). The defendant's sixth amendment right of confrontation, not the evi-
dentiary law of relevancy, blocks the prosecution from attempting to benefit from this witness'
assertion. See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418-20 (1965).
122. Another reason courts might exclude Witness' assertion is that it might be cumulative evi-
dence in light of the other evidence of Witness' guilt and Defendant's innocence. For discussion of
this point in a constitutional context, see infra note 260.
123. In apparently no reported case has a court discussed rule 403 or its state counterpart.
124. Rule 403's other grounds for excluding ("confusion of the issues ... undue delay, waste of
time") do not apply.
125. The prosecution's inability to cross-examine Witness seems germane to the danger that the
jury might be misled, but courts often seem to treat this as an independent reason for forbidding
Defendant from attempting to benefit from Witness' assertion. The inability to cross-examine prob-
ably does not fit within any of rule 403's other categories. See supra note 124.
[Vol. 78:1
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
for a way to help the jury understand the possible value of, and problems
with, the evidence. 126 As discussed below, the court could provide this
assistance by orchestrating Witness' appearance and by commenting on the
reasons why Witness might have invoked the privilege. Following the struc-
ture of rule 403, we first consider Defendant's interest in introducing Wit-
ness' assertion, followed by the harm to the prosecution if it is introduced,
and finally whether the harm outweighs the benefit.
1. The Value of Witness' Assertion to Defendant
In calculating the benefit to the proponent, the court should consider the
proponent's need to introduce the evidence and its probative significance.1 27
Bowles helps us to explore the probative value to Defendant of Witness' privi-
lege assertion. In that case, there appeared to be almost as much evidence of
Witness' (Smith's) guilt as there was of Defendant's (Bowles') guilt. Each
had confessed. Bowles testified that he was innocent and explained why he
had falsely implicated himself;128 Smith, of course, did neither. Additionally,
Smith had provided circumstantial evidence of his guilt by searching for one
of Bowles' witnesses, apparently to warn him not to repeat Smith's admis-
sion. There was no reason to suspect that the defense witnesses who reported
Smith's confession or threat had a reason to lie to help Bowles. The prosecu-
tion's pathologist said only that the knife Bowles carried upon arrest could
have been used to cause the mortal wound, not that it did cause the
wound.129 Neither side introduced direct evidence about the murder or the
murderer's identity.
One suspects that Smith's assertion of the fifth amendment might have had
an explosive effect upon Bowles' jury. There appeared to be no danger of
collusion. 130 When Bowles testified that he was innocent and Smith publicly
refused to deny his guilt when he could have done so without risk,131 the jury
might have leapt upon the inference that Smith had impliedly confirmed de-
fense counsel's accusations.
This example demonstrates that forcing Witness to assert the privilege
before the jury highlights that Defendant is prosecuting as he is being prose-
cuted. In the morality play of a criminal trial, 132 Defendant will almost
126. Cf Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 220, 245-50
(1976) (discussing less intrusive alternatives to exclusion).
127. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE
§ 5214, at 269-71 (1978).
128. For his explanation, see supra note 27.
129. Recall that the expert's opinion was perplexing. See supra note 30.
130. There was no evidence that Bowles and Smith even knew each other.
131. The prosecution was neither prosecuting nor considering prosecuting Smith.
132. It is nothing new to say that criminal trials involve moral judgments by the factfinders. See
Jackson, Questions of Fact and Questions of Law, in FAcTs IN LAW 97 (W. Twining ed. 1983);
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surely need to testify, even if by not testifying he could keep secret his odious
criminal record. 133 Defendant will contrast his eagerness to explain his posi-
tion with Witness' unwillingness to do so. Moreover, if Witness is not forced
to assert the privilege before the jury, the jury may believe that the defense
merely fabricated the evidence implicating Witness. In Bowles, when Smith
did not appear as a witness to confirm or deny the defense's accusation of
him, the jury might readily have concluded that the defense witnesses had
either concocted "Smith's" existence or misreported what Smith had said, or
that Smith had spoken as reported but for a reason other than to admit cul-
pability.1 3 4 An instruction by the court that neither side can call Witness to
testify will in theory snuff out the first concern, 135 but not the other two. In
cases like Bowles, then, Defendant would benefit from having Witness assert
the privilege before the jury.
In single-culprit cases, the court could extract enough information
through a conventional evidentiary hearing to establish the importance of
letting Defendant try to benefit from Witness' assertion. To receive a hear-
ing, defense counsel would inform the court and the prosecution that he in-
tends to call a person whom he believes will assert the fifth amendment at
trial to questions designed to substitute him for Defendant as the culprit.
The hearing itself would be in effect a dress rehearsal for Witness' appear-
ance before the jury. Defense counsel and the prosecutor would question
Witness as they would were Witness to appear at trial. Defense counsel
would present every scrap of information the defense had about Witness'
culpability, including inadmissible information such as a relevant trait of
Witness' character, the opinions of others that Witness was the culprit, or
evidence that the police had once suspected Witness before deciding to
charge Defendant. 136 Witness, or his attorney, would explain why Witness
fears incriminating himself in answer to each question.
The defense may balk at disclosing this information, however, for tactical
and constitutional reasons. The defense undeniably gains a tactical advan-
tage by not informing the prosecution until a dramatic point in the trial that
it will call Witness. If that announcement will surprise the prosecution, 137 it
McCabe, Discussions in the Jury Room: Are They Like This?, in BRITISH JURY SYSTEM 23-26 (N.
Walker ed. 1975).
133. See FED. R. EvID. 609 (permitting use of prior convictions to impeach witnesses, including
defendant-witnesses on cross-examination under certain defined circumstances).
134. Of course, undue prejudice and orchestration of Witness' appearance remain as sources of
jury error even if Smith does assert the privilege before the jury.
135. In Bowles, the court of appeals thought that the trial judge should have given this instruc-
tion, had either side asked for it. 439 F.2d at 542.
136. In deciding admissibility questions, the judge may consider inadmissible evidence. FED. R.
EVID. 104(a).
137. The prosecution might receive a mid-trial continuance to investigate Witness' culpability,
but by delaying disclosure the defense can increase the prosecution's difficulty in investigating.
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will startle the jury. Nonetheless, the court will surely rule against Defend-
ant if defense counsel mulishly refuses to disclose this information in the
hope of gaining surprise. People v. Thomas138 is an illustration.
The defendant in Thomas, charged with robbery, was arrested driving the
escape car. He defended by claiming that he had borrowed the car from its
owner, Whitlock, and that Whitlock had committed the robbery by himself.
Whitlock's hearsay statement that he alone had committed the crime was
admitted into evidence. Whitlock would not testify and asserted the fifth
amendment when called as a witness by the defense. Defense counsel stub-
bornly refused to tell the court the questions he wanted to ask Whitlock,
claiming that the defense had an absolute right to call any person as a witness
and to question that person without disclosing the questions in advance.
The court of appeals, agreeing with the trial court's refusal to force Whit-
lock to assert the privilege before the jury, worried that the assertion would
create a "very real danger that the jury would infer" that Whitlock was
"guilty of a particular crime."' 39 Drawing the inference would have been
wrong because Whitlock might have asserted the privilege for reasons
"wholly unrelated to the crime at issue in the instant trial."' 14° As uncon-
vincing as this reasoning is, defense counsel freed the court of appeals to
speculate about theoretical crimes when he spurned the trial court's request
to list the questions he wanted to ask. Moreover, counsel should have sup-
plied the answers that he expected Witness would give if he answered truth-
fully and pinpointed the role the privilege assertion would play in the defense
case.
In addition to the tactical reasons that Defendant might not want to share
with the prosecution his information, implicating Witness, disclosing this in-
formation also creates a constitutional issue. With notice, the prosecution
might be able to convince or force Witness to testify against Defendant. Dis-
closure would then help the prosecution add evidence to its case-in-chief and
might conflict with Defendant's personal fifth amendment privilege.' 4 ' De-
fendants are often required to disclose other sorts of information in advance
138. 51 N.Y.2d 466, 415 N.E.2d 931, 434 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1980).
139. Id. at 472, 415 N.E.2d at 934, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 944. The court of appeals' vague observation
must have meant the robbery with which the defendant was charged, because the defense would call
Whitlock only to substitute him for the defendant.
140. Id.
141. In a related context, some commentators have suggested that a defendant must disclose in a
pretrial hearing his intent to introduce the penal interest statement of an unavailable declarant. See
4 Weinstein's Evid. (MB) T 804(b)(3)[03] (1988). Because the declarant must be unavailable, the
prosecution may have trouble finding him and thus will find no evidence to undercut the force of
the declarant's statement. Yet, to satisfy the exception's corroboration requirement, the defendant
may need to reveal information that the prosecution could use in its case-in-chief. Thus, this disclo-
sure requirement, like one that would involve Witness, may impinge on the defendant's fifth amend-
ment right.
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of trial. 142 But, obligating Defendant to disclose the information about Wit-
ness differs from obligating him to disclose other sorts of information.
Although a defendant is required to disclose the identity of an alibi or psychi-
atric witness, he only comes under this obligation because he expects the
witness to testify on his behalf. In contrast, in many cases the defense does
not know what Witness would say if he were to testify truthfully, because it
is in Witness' interest not to talk with the defense or to lie if he does talk.
Disclosure without this advance knowledge involves a high risk. If the de-
fense knew in advance that Witness would testify favorably for the prosecu-
tion, it would not call Witness, it would avoid the need to disclose to the
prosecution, and it would only introduce the evidence of Witness' guilt that it
had found. Nonetheless, even if requiring Defendant to disclose clashes with
his fifth amendment protection,' 43 Defendant should waive the objection and
embrace the risk that Witness would help the prosecution as a welcome cost
of gaining the opportunity to benefit from Witness' assertion of the fifth
amendment privilege.
Defendant might accept that exchange-disclosure in exchange for the op-
portunity to benefit-for several reasons. The need to disclose counsel's
questions and the expected answers at a hearing would spur defense counsel
to search thoroughly for evidence to support its claim about Witness. More-
over, as long as courts remain reluctant to override Witness' desire to assert
the fifth amendment, they are not apt to inspect closely the relevancy of Wit-
ness' assertion unless Defendant spreads before them evidence of Witness'
complicity. During an evidentiary hearing, defense counsel should be freed
of the restriction that he have a good faith belief that Witness, if he answered
truthfully, would confirm the existence of any evidence about which counsel
asked.'44 This would allow counsel to probe deeply Witness' complicity. 145
142. Defendants are sometimes required to disclose certain defenses (i.e,, alibi, state of mind),
physical evidence, and the names, addresses, and statements of defense witnesses. See generally W,
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.4 (1985). These requirements are said to affect
only the time when the defendant will disclose, because he must inevitably disclose at trial if he
decides to assert the defense or introduce the evidence. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85
(1970). Supporting this view is the fact that if, after disclosing, the defendant decides to forego the
defense or not to introduce the evidence, that shift in defense tactics cannot be used against him.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(f) (alibi), 12.2(e) (insanity or mental disease).
143. Although a person is not normally required to disclose damaging evidence, there are excep-
tions. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 413 n.12 (1976) (defendant must disclose subpoe-
naed material unless disclosure would constitute the only way for the prosecution to authenticate
the material); Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 306 Pa. Super. 5, 21-22, 514 A.2d 114, 119 (1986) (de-
fense counsel must disclose physical evidence in his possession even if evidence incriminates the
client).
144. See supra note 109.
145. For example, counsel should be able to ask a witness like Smith in Bowles whether at the
time the crime was committed he owned a knife like the murder weapon, even if counsel does not
know the answer. The court can advise Witness that he will not incriminate himself if he can
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With this information, the court could determine more accurately the infer-
ences one could draw from Witness' assertion and thus the significance of the
assertion. 146 The court could also decide how to choreograph Witness' ap-
pearance before the jury, and thus further reduce the likelihood that the jury
will overestimate the meaning of Witness' assertion.
The hearing would have an effect on the prosecution as well. The prosecu-
tion would need to give the defense any information it obtained in investigat-
ing Witness that supported Defendant's claim that Witness either is the
culprit or has exculpatory information. 147 Also, with the opportunity to in-
vestigate why Witness might be asserting the privilege, the prosecution's
claim of evidentiary prejudice would lose strength. Most importantly for De-
fendant, the prosecution might decide to dismiss the charge against Defend-
ant after reviewing the information about Witness.
In summary, if defense counsel identifies the questions he wants to ask
Witness, the answers he expects to be offered if Witness testifies truthfully,
and the importance to the defense of having the assertion made before the
jury, the court will be in a position to evaluate the probative value of Wit-
ness' assertion. Having made this evaluation, the court's next step under rule
403 is to calculate the prejudice the prosecution might suffer if the jury were
permitted to consider why Witness asserted the privilege.
2. The Prejudice to the Prosecution
Courts worry that the prosecution will suffer evidentiary prejudice because
the jury will overvalue the importance of Witness' assertion. This worry is
enhanced by the prosecution's inability to cross-examine Witness. The first
ground seems overblown; the second is one the prosecution can eliminate. A
truthfully deny that he owned such a knife. If Witness then asserts the privilege, the court can infer
that Witness implicitly confirmed that he does own such a knife.
The good faith restriction discussed in this context is drawn from the good faith belief counsel
must have in cross-examining a character witness or in challenging a witness' character for truthful-
ness. See FED. R. EvID. 404, 405, 608. The good faith test substitutes for counsel's inability to
introduce extrinsic evidence to prove his contention. See FED. R. EvID. 405, 608.
146. As part of this effort, the court could determine whether Witness would assert the privilege
and whether he could properly do so. To that end, the court should explain to Witness how to
evaluate his exposure, and Witness should have time to decide whether to assert the privilege. In
Bowles, for example, if Smith had been asked for the first time before the jury whether he had
possessed a knife of the sort that was used to kill the victim, he might reflexively have asserted the
fifth amendment even if he had no knife. In contrast, during a hearing, the court could describe the
evidence both sides had collected of Smith's guilt, and thus could explain the relevance of each
question.
147. Cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (prosecution's suppression of extrajudicial
confession by defendant's confederate was denial of due process). Indeed, one could condition De-
fendant's disclosure upon the prosecution's disclosure of all of its evidence of Witness' culpability.
This exchange would parallel the discovery of objects and tests in federal prosecutions. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 16.
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third possible source of misestimation-orchestrating Witness' appearance
before the jury-is one that the courts have not considered because all have
found prejudice from the first two grounds. This third ground is reviewed in
Part II.D.3 below.
There is reason to fear that the jury will overvalue Witness' assertion. 148
Witness' dramatic assertion of the fifth amendment will rivet the jury's atten-
tion. Yet, because Witness will not disclose (even to the court, in camera 149)
the information he hides, and because he can so easily satisfy the test to
assert the privilege, it is possible that Witness, were he to testify, would say
nothing that would help Defendant. But, this problem of estimation infects
all evidence. Few blanch at drawing an inference of a defendant's guilt from
his refusal to testify,150 even though a defendant's decision not to testify is
probably more often prompted by reasons unconnected with his guilt than is
Witness'.' 5 ' Moreover, by closely inspecting the evidence of Witness' (and of
Defendant's) guilt, the court can identify the inferences a jury could draw
from Witness' assertion. Perhaps the court could then help the jury to rank
each inference as a possible explanation of Witness' decision.
Rather than rooting their discussion of misestimation in the facts of the
particular case,' 52 courts have summarily concluded that the privilege asser-
tion is so marginally relevant and yet so potentially dramatic that the jury
will inevitably overvalue its significance. Again, People v. Thomas15 3 pro-
vides an example. Did Thomas or did Whitlock rob the station attendant
and escape in the stolen car? Evidence linked each man to the crime.
Thomas was stopped as he drove the escape car, about thirty minutes after
the robbery. In searching him, the police found approximately forty-five sin-
gle dollar bills, a few more than those taken in the robbery. Yet, in searching
Thomas and the car, the police did not find the gun that the culprit had used.
The victim's identification of Thomas during the trial might have been erro-
neous, as his pretrial identification had been excluded because the police had
148. The jury might also undervalue the importance of the assertion, if, for example, it did not
learn of some inadmissible information Defendant had that linked Witness to the crime.
149. For details of such an in camera hearing, see the proposal infra Part III.B and note 236.
150. See supra notes 74-95 and accompanying text. Recall also that when a witness called by the
prosecution asserts the privilege to questions connecting him to the defendant and the crime, that
assertion is considered relevant to the defendant's guilt. See supra note 121; see also MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENCE Rule 233 (1942) (permitting judge and parties to comment on, andj trier of fact to
draw inferences from, assertion of any privilege).
151. Compare supra text accompanying notes 83-85 (defendant's reasons to not testify) with
supra text accompanying notes 103-05 (witness' reasons to testify).
152. Judge Ely, in his Beye dissent, stands alone in having identified the inferences one might
reasonably draw from Witness' exercise of the fifth amendment. See supra note 113 and accompa-
nying text.
153. 51 N.Y.2d 466, 415 N.E.2d 931, 434 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1980). For an earlier discussion of
Thomas, see supra text accompanying notes 138-39.
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used suggestive procedures. 154 Thomas had two alibi witnesses. He also tes-
tified that Whitlock, a friend, had loaned him the car at a time after the
robbery had occurred and shortly before he was stopped by the police. Whit-
lock, at some later point while in jail on an unrelated matter, admitted to
another inmate who apparently had no ties to Thomas, that he alone had
committed the crime. Had Whitlock been forced to assert the fifth amend-
ment before Thomas' jury, his refusal to testify would have supported
Thomas' "prosecution" of him.
Nonetheless, the court of appeals deplored the possibility that the jury
might have drawn an inference in Thomas' favor. The court ignored the
facts, preferring instead to hypothesize that Whitlock could have refused to
testify for reasons unconnected to the robbery.1 55 This sort of specious hy-
pothesizing about the harm the prosecution might suffer is not what rule 403
permits courts to do. Instead, courts must demand that the prosecution
identify the locus of possible jury overvaluation. Just as Defendant must
identify how he would be helped by Witness' assertion, the prosecution must
try to identify reasons unrelated to Defendant that Witness might refuse to
testify. 156 If the prosecution fails to do this, it has not met its burden.
The prosecution's ostensible inability to cross-examine Witness is also said
to be a source of prejudice. Rather than treating this inability as an in-
dependent source of evidentiary damage,1 57 let us consider it in connection
154. Thomas, 51 N.Y.2d at 475 n.3, 415 N.E.2d at 934 n.3, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 946 n.3. The court
of appeals did not indicate whether the victim had ever said Whitlock was not the robber.
155. See supra text accompanying note 139. Whitlock might have invoked the privilege to avoid
disclosing possession of the stolen car rather than his commission of the robbery. Possessing the
car, however, would itself have constituted important circumstantial evidence linking him to the
robbery and supporting Thomas' explanation of how he had gotten the car.
156. Illustrating the effect that this disclosure may have upon the prosecution is an example from
the tentative draft of a rule in the Model Code of Evidence. This rule would have authorized the
judge and the parties to comment on anyone's assertion of a privilege and would have allowed the
jury to draw any inferences from that assertion. During the defendant's trial for murder, the vic-
tim's butler asserts the fifth amendment when asked by the prosecution whether he had left the
pantry window unlocked on the night of the crime. When the prosecution reveals that the butler is
being prosecuted for the unrelated crime of assisting a thief in stealing the victim's silver, the court
has discretion to forbid the prosecution from arguing that the butler is shielding the defendant and
the defendant from arguing that the butler killed the victim by himself. MODEL CODE OF EVI-
DENCE Rule 225 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1940).
157. The prosecution's inability to cross-examine Witness does not justify finding prejudice
under rule 403, for hearsay evidence is often admitted without being tested by cross-examination.
Indeed, the Model Code of Evidence justified drawing inferences from assertions of any privilege by
drawing a parallel with hearsay. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 233 comment (1942) ("By
further examination [the opponent] might develop facts which would destroy all basis for [an infer-
ence against him from assertion of a privilege]. He has no means of testing the truth of the infer-
ence .... This is to say that some of the objections applicable to hearsay are applicable to the
comment. If hearsay statements by persons whose direct testimony is unavailable are to be re-
ceived, then the comment [upon assertion of a privilege] should be permitted.").
Nonetheless, there is a difference between drawing an inference from Witness' privilege assertion
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with whether Witness' privilege assertion might mislead the jury. If able to
cross-examine Witness, the prosecution could uncover Witness' connection
to the crime and knowledge about Defendant's (and his own) guilt. But by
asserting the privilege, Witness blocks the prosecution as well as Defendant.
Moreover, the prosecution might fear that questioning Witness in front of
the jury might exacerbate the damage to its case from the assertion. In
Bowles, for example, the prosecutor might have worried about asking the
inverse of the sorts of questions defense counsel would have asked.158 The
jury might expect that Witness, having been attacked by the defense during
direct examination, would view the prosecutor as his savior. Witness, by not
answering the prosecutor's questions and denying the defense's accusations,
might make the jury more comfortable in inferring that Witness had implic-
itly conceded Defendant's attack.159
The prosecution, however, can sweep away this dilemma by granting Wit-
ness use immunity. No court has asked whether the prosecution's ability to
eliminate the alleged source of evidentiary prejudice itself warrants finding
that it has suffered no prejudice. A party should not be able to invoke rule
403 to exclude evidence when it (and it alone) has the power to eliminate the
basis of its objection. 160
and admitting hearsay. A type of hearsay qualifies for class exemption only if it is reliable in the run
of cases, even if the result is to admit hearsay whose reliability appears suspect in the particular
case. Inferring Defendant's innocence from Witness' assertion of the privilege might appear less
accurate than inferring the truth of a class-exempted hearsay statement. Yet, by carefully examin-
ing the context in which Witness asserts the privilege, the court should be able to satisfy itself of the
probative value of the assertion. Indeed, if the court is worried that the evidence points to Witness
as the true culprit, it might grant Defendant's motion for acquittal.
158. See supra text accompanying note 109. Examples of the questions the prosecutor might ask
include: "You never had a knife of the sort that could have caused the fatal wound?" "You never
told Neely or Bowles that you had killed a man, as they say you did?"
159. Cf Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 542 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc) (as a tactical
matter, Defendant might not call Witness in hope that jury would expect prosecution to call Wit-
ness to refute Defendant's accusation, and would hold it against prosecution when it did not), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
Of course, the court could mollify this problem by telling the jury that Witness would waive the
protection of the privilege were he to answer any question that might tend to incriminate him. This
point, however, does not undercut the prosecutor's concern over asking any questions.
160. Two other examples are relevant to this issue. Could a party simultaneously refuse to stipu-
late to proof of a relevant fact while invoking rule 403 to challenge the evidence the proponent
wishes to introduce to prove that fact? Cf United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 13 (lst Cir. 1986)
(reversing conviction when prosecution refused to accept stipulation concerning facts and instead
insisted upon calling defendants' attorneys to testify to those facts). Could the prosecution establish
that a witness was unavailable to introduce his hearsay statement and to satisfy the confrontation
clause if the cause of unavailability was the witness' assertion of the fifth amendment? Might not
the prosecution be required to grant immunity to that witness to force him to testify? Cf United
States v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 955, 985 n.79 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part)
(suggesting that if the prosecution could introduce against the defendant the hearsay statement of
an alleged coparticipant whose prosecution had not been joined with the defendant's, the prosecu-
tion had to grant that hearsay declarant (coparticipant) use immunity to appear in defendant's trial
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This point is especially telling in single-culprit crimes, in which the prose-
cution has no substantive reason to refuse to grant use immunity to Witness.
In multi-culprit crimes, however, the prosecution may understandably decry
granting use immunity to Witness. In those instances, Witness (the former
codefendant) and Defendant must be prosecuted separately.1 61 In the sepa-
rate trial of Witness (now a defendant), the prosecution might have trouble
showing that it was not using against Witness the testimony that Witness
gave in Defendant's trial.162
Only in multi-culprit crimes, however, does granting Witness use immu-
nity threaten to disrupt or damage Witness' prosecution. This problem does
not arise in single-culprit crimes because the prosecution, having decided to
prosecute Defendant, has no need to protect its ability to gather evidence of
Witness complicity independently from his testimony. 163 Indeed, the prose-
cution refuses to grant use immunity to Witness in order to achieve a tactical
advantage over Defendant (by denying him Witness' testimony) rather than
to ensure that it can prosecute Witness in case Defendant is acquitted. Given
Defendant's present inability to try to benefit from Witness' invocation of the
privilege, the prosecution's refusal to grant use immunity can hamper, if not
cripple, Defendant's attempt to shift responsibility to Witness. As a result,
the jury may more easily convict Defendant. 164
3. Has the Prosecution Met its Burden Under Rule 403?
As the preceding section reveals, the fear of jury misestimation is exagger-
ated. What little legitimate concern that exists can be diffused by the prose-
cution's granting use immunity to Witness (in single-culprit crimes). Also,
rule 403, which is slanted toward admitting evidence, seems to obligate the
as long as the defendant could make a "substantial showing that the declarant's testimony [was]
necessary to rebut the effect of the alleged statement").
161. If the prosecutions were joined, use immunity would not provide a codefendant with protec-
tion coextensive with the fifth amendment's protection. In assessing the codefendant's guilt, realis-
tically the jury could not ignore the testimony that the codefendant gave under the grant of
immunity.
162. Commentators disagree over the cost and effectiveness of procedures the prosecution can
use to satisfy the demands of use immunity. Compare Flanaghan, supra note 10, at 463 (the
problems are significant) with Westen, supra note 10, at 169-70 (the problems are not significant).
163. This point is reinforced if courts conduct a hearing of the sort described in Part II.D.1,
supra. If it were to prosecute Witness after Defendant was acquitted, the prosecution could add the
evidence of Witness' guilt that Defendant had found to whatever it had obtained before Witness
testified under use immunity.
164. The irony of not granting use immunity to Witness in a single-culprit crime is that his
testimony would increase the chance the jury would convict Defendant. If he were innocent, Wit-
ness could truthfully counter the evidence of his guilt. If he were guilty, Witness would have an
interest in lying in the hope that his lies might also sway the jury to convict Defendant. In lying,
Witness would run almost no risk of being charged with perjury. To charge him with perjury, the
prosecution would have to concede that it had relied on perjurious testimony in convicting
Defendant.
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court to search for ways to reduce the possible prejudice and to admit the
challenged evidence. There are at least two ways the court could do this: (1)
by orchestrating Witness' appearance before the jury, and (2) by commenting
on the possible significance of Witness' assertion of the privilege.
The court will want to diminish the drama of Witness' appearance before
the jury. It could begin to do this by explaining to the jury, at the time
Witness is called to testify, how easy it is for a witness to invoke the fifth
amendment privilege and how difficult it is to determine the significance of
that invocation. 165 The court might also forbid defense counsel from asking
leading questions that drip with accusation. It could decide during the pre-
trial hearing which questions would be permissible, and then have a clerk
read them to Witness. Or, the court might describe to the jury the topics
about which Witness would refuse to answer questions. 166 With either ap-
proach, the need for Witness to appear before the jury might be eliminated,
but Witness should probably appear to confirm that he would invoke the
privilege. 167
To help the jury grapple with the meaning of Witness' assertion, 68 the
court could also identify the inferences the jury might draw and suggest the
weight each inference deserved. 169 The court could do this either after Wit-
165. The court might add that it would be wrong to infer that Witness had necessarily conceded
that he was guilty by asserting the privilege, let alone that he would reveal information that incrimi-
nated himself by answering the questions truthfully.
166. In Bowles, for example, the jury could learn that Witness would answer no questions about
his possession of a knife like the murder weapon. That information would be less explosive, but no
less telling, than having Witness assert the privilege before the jury in response to a loaded question
such as: "You had a knife like the one the killer used, didn't you?"
167. Witness might also unexpectedly decide to answer certain questions. Moreover, Witness
should be required to make at least a cameo appearance when the culprit's identification is in issue.
The jury should be made to compare the physical appearance of both Defendant and Witness with
the description of the culprit given by the eyewitnesses.
168. It would be folly to presume that the jury could evaluate the meaning of Witness' assertion
without specific assistance from the court. Nonetheless, in other contexts courts take similar leaps
of faith. See, e.g., Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954) ("unfounded speculation" that jury
would not follow instruction prohibiting it from considering codefendant's statement against de-
fendant); Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (severance of counts not necessary
when jury can distinguish evidence relevant to each).
169. As an example of the sort of instruction a judge might give, consider Beye, our illustration
of a multi-culprit crime in which each defendant says that the other was alone responsible. In Beye,
the judge could identify both the most plausible and the most implausible reason why Smith (Wit-
ness) had asserted the privilege. The most likely reason would be self interest: by testifying, Smith
would have helped the State to prepare its prosecution of him. Extremely unlikely, on the other
hand, would be the possibility that the two had colluded for Smith to mislead the jury into thinking
that he alone had committed the crime. Although courts worry about collusion in multi-culprit
crimes, to show how the two might have colluded would require quite labored reasoning. First, the
two would have needed to understand that their prosecutions had to be severed as a condition for
Beye to call Smith to testify, because no defendant can call a codefendant to assert the privilege.
Next, Smith would have had to convince his attorney that he was innocent and that he would testify
accordingly. Otherwise, Smith's counsel never would have baited Beye to contest Smith as counsel
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ness had testified or when the jury was instructed. In contrast to the English
trial judge's often caustic, disparaging evaluation of the defendant's or the
prosecution's evidence,1 70 American judges hesitate to summarize or to com-
ment upon the evidence. 71 They probably hesitate out of concern that the
jury may unblinkingly adopt the judge's evaluation, when the judge herself
might have erred. 172 Yet, even if, as we might expect, judges are skeptical (if
not derisive) about the importance of Witness' exercise of the privilege, de-
fendants would probably welcome judicial evaluation in exchange for the op-
portunity to try to benefit from Witness' refusal to testify.
This analysis suggests that if courts take rule 403 seriously, they should
overrule the prosecution's prejudice objection, at least in single-culprit
crimes like Bowles. This is especially so if one interprets rule 403 to mean
that the objection fails whenever the objecting party has the opportunity to
overcome the source of the prejudice (here, by granting use immunity), or if
the court has ways other than excluding evidence to diffuse the prejudice
(here, by staging Witness' appearance and by comment). Courts, however,
have taken the opposite approach. Rather than search for ways to reduce the
did in the opening statement. Moreover, Smith and Beye would have had to assume that the open-
ing statement by Smith's counsel would prompt the court to declare a mistrial, as it did. If the
court had not granted a mistrial, the two would have been in trouble. In their joint trial, Smith
would have had to testify that he was innocent or risk that the jury would infer that he was guilty
from his failure to fulfill his attorney's promise that he would testify. But, if Smith did testify, his
testimony would have damned Beye because, consistent with his attorney's promise in the opening
statement, he would have had to say that he was innocent and Beye was guilty. However, Beye
would not be happy to accept that result and might well have retaliated by testifying that he was
innocent and that Smith was guilty. This conflict in their testimony might have led the jury to
convict both. Colluding in this way, then, would require more insight and luck than defendants
often have. Hence, a court could readily instruct the jury that collusion had probably not prompted
a former codefendant like Smith to assert the privilege when called by Defendant to testify.
170. Typical examples culled from the instructions the author heard one judge give in a murder
prosecution include: "There is not a shadow of doubt that the blood in this terrible scene was that
of the victim-but that is for you [the jury] to decide .... " In discussing the sequence of wounds,
the judge, after identifying the choices, added: "This is a matter entirely for you, but this [i.e., the
judge's] interpretation may be one you choose to accept." In commenting on the defendant's claim
he had been hoodwinked by the police into confessing, the judge asked rhetorically: "Do you [the
jury] think this defendant has the intelligence to understand what the police asked him to do?"
After a dramatic pause, he added, "You must decide."
171. In deleting from the Federal Rules of Evidence the proposed rule 105, authorizing federal
judges to summarize and comment on the evidence, Congress did not intend to strip that authority
from the judiciary. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE, H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7078-79. State court judges, however, do not always have this authority.
See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 115, at 1079 & n.37.
172. Also, jurisdictions rather naively claim that the jury should decide factual guilt, as if the
jury might ignore other influences, like the arguments and conduct of the attorneys. R. LEMPERT
& S. SALTZBURG, supra note 115, at 1079. Commentators continue to criticize judicial comment
and evaluation. See Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge, 64
VA. L. REV. 1 (1978).
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possible prejudice of having Witness assert the privilege before the jury, they
bar Witness' appearance and seek other ways to help Defendant. The usual
way is for the trial judge to explain to the jury that neither side may call
Witness to testify, without explaining why. 173 This method, ostensibly neu-
tral, is doubly wrong. The jury can infer that the prosecution has no interest
in calling Witness because its case is against Defendant, not Witness. Yet,
the jury may expect Defendant to call Witness. When he does not, the jury,
despite the instruction, may hold this failure against Defendant. Second, the
instruction misleads the jury because the prosecution can call Witness by
granting him use immunity.
If the prosecution's prejudice objection is overruled, Defendant has sur-
mounted another hurdle. However, rule 403 is not a rule of admission.
Other evidentiary barriers remain for Defendant to overcome, such as the
fear of collusion and the perceived need for symmetry.
E. WITNESS LIES IN CLAIMING TO INCRIMINATE HIMSELF
Haunting courts is the fear that Witness will try to help a guilty Defendant
by falsely claiming that he would incriminate himself if he testified truth-
fully.' 74 The fear is that if Witness were to testify honestly, he would neither
implicate himself nor exonerate Defendant, nor even provide evidence of use
to the defense. How realistic is this fear, and are there ways to reduce the
risk of this sort of deception while allowing Defendant to try to benefit from
Witness' assertion? Postponing for a moment the possibility of collusion in a
multi-culprit crime, consider this script in a single-culprit crime in which the
prosecution believes Defendant killed the victim. Witness, when questioned
173. In Bowles, for example, the court of appeals, in dictum, noted that this instruction would
"undoubtedly" have been given had defense counsel so requested. Bowles v. United States, 439
F.2d 536, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971).
174. See Hill, Testimonial Privileges and Fair Trial, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1173, 1181 (1980)
(describing "danger of collusion" as "serious," but not giving examples of its occurrence); J.
MAGUIRE, supra note 63, § 2.061, at 54 (suggesting Witness who asserted privilege when asked if he
had sexual relations with girl prior to Defendant's alleged statutory rape might "deliberately have
sought to aid defendant"). Those courts that worry over collusion have not pegged it to an eviden-
tiary rule. Collusion probably would come under rule 403's test of prejudice.
The same fear has stopped courts from creating a hearsay exception for defense-offered state-
ments against penal interest when the defendant seeks to shift sole responsibility to the declarant.
See Respondent's (State of Mississippi) Brief at 7 n.3, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)
(No. 71-5908) (detailing how defendant could collude with declarant for declarant falsely to impli-
cate himself to witnesses who would unwittingly report his alleged penal interest statements). The
concern that a defendant could induce a witness falsely to make a penal interest statement is much
more real than the concern that Defendant could collude with Witness. Because admission of a
penal interest statement is conditioned upon the hearsay declarant's unavailability, it is impossible
to learn why he spoke and whether he honestly incriminated himself. In contrast, in our setting the
prosecution could always grant Witness use immunity to force him to disclose what he knew and
whether he committed the crime.
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
by defense counsel, invokes the privilege.175 The jury, impressed and misled
by Witness' refusal to testify, erroneously acquits Defendant, having incor-
rectly inferred that Witness has implicitly admitted that he, and not Defend-
ant, was the killer. The incensed prosecutor then charges Witness for the
murder. 176 Witness (now the defendant) does not testify in his own trial, but
Defendant (now the witness) testifies and truthfully admits that he alone
committed the crime. The jury in Witness' trial, not learning that Witness
had asserted the fifth amendment in Defendant's trial or that Defendant had
been acquitted of the same charge, properly acquits Witness.
The prosecutor appears stymied. The double jeopardy clause insulates De-
fendant from being reprosecuted for the murder charge. Nor can he be pros-
ecuted for perjury: he did not testify at his own trial and he told the truth in
admitting guilt while testifying in Witness' trial. Witness is probably also
protected from being charged with perjury for falsely having invoked the
privilege in Defendant's trial because it is so easy to justify asserting the
privilege. 177
Although the possibility of collusion of this sort is troubling, the risk that
it might occur is so unlikely and, when the risk exists, its existence so obvi-
ous, that the worry is exaggerated. 178 Likely candidates for collusion are
Defendant's spouse, relative, or friend. Yet, these relationships, reeking of
the incentive for collusion, are ones no juror would ignore in assessing the
significance of the assertion. If an innocent defendant's brother were honora-
ble, the jury might reason, Defendant would not have been prosecuted be-
cause the brother would have admitted his guilt to the police. The jury
would thus deeply discount the importance of the assertion by such a person,
especially if the court told the jury that Witness suffers no legal detriment
from the assertion. 179
If no close relationship exists between Defendant and Witness, the likeli-
hood of collusion shrinks considerably. This is so because the risks to De-
fendant and Witness from colluding rise sharply. First, they would need to
recruit other conspirators, thereby increasing the risk of discovery.' 80 Sec-
175. Defendant and Witness must also deceive defense counsel because professional responsibil-
ity rules prohibit counsel from introducing false evidence. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4)
(1981). Indeed, if counsel learns of the deception, he is obligated to notify the court of the fraud.
Id. DR 7-102(B)(2).
176. The prosecution could use against Witness the evidence that Defendant had introduced to
shift responsibility to Witness, coupled with whatever evidence it could find independently.
177. This is especially so if Defendant introduced evidence that implicated Witness.
178. In no reported case has there been a hint of collusion.
179. This information might be part of the instructions the judge would give the jury about how
to evaluate the assertion. For other instructions and a discussion of prejudice, see supra Part II.D.3.
Alternatively, the judge could allow the prosecutor to make the point during final argument.
180. In Bowles, for example, Bowles and Smith would have had to mislead or inveigle the other
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ond, Defendant would almost surely need to testify during the trial. If all
criminal trials are morality plays, 81 Defendant must sharply contrast his
credibility with that of Witness. The defense wants the jury to believe that
only a person who desperately wants to hide his guilt would remain silent
when challenged by defense counsel's accusatory questions. Witness, were
he innocent, would forthrightly counter the incriminating information of his
guilt to help the jury convict the guilty Defendant. By not testifying, De-
fendant would weaken the force of his "prosecution" of Witness. 182 But by
testifying, he opens himself to the risks noted above.18 3
Defendant and Witness run a third risk: being prosecuted for obstructing
justice or conspiring to obstruct justice. To demonstrate the relevancy of
Witness' privilege assertion, Defendant must have evidence to support his
claim that Witness is solely responsible. Moreover, to persuade the jury of
his accusation, Defendant may need more evidence of Witness' guilt than
that needed to establish the relevancy of Witness' assertion. g8 4 Because Wit-
ness is innocent and Defendant is guilty, the two may need to fabricate evi-
dence of Witness' guilt to satisfy the judge and then the jury. By enlarging
the collusion in this way, they increase the risk of being charged with ob-
structing justice. This risk is further increased if the defense must disclose
the evidence supporting Defendant's claim about Witness' guilt in a hearing
before the trial begins. 185 With notice, the prosecution may uncover this sec-
ond fabrication. Evidence that the two had fabricated false evidence of Wit-
ness' guilt would damn Defendant in the jury's view.
Ironically, Witness runs a different risk if this second fabrication succeeds
in misleading the jury into acquitting Defendant. The prosecution may de-
cide to prosecute Witness, and to use against him the false evidence that the
witnesses who testified about Smith's admission of guilt into joining the conspiracy. In Thomas,
Whitlock (Witness) would either have had to deceive Whitlock's cellmate into thinking that he had
honestly implicated himself or include him in the conspiracy.
181. See supra note 132.
182. This point has its basis in tactics, not in the cases. Because no Defendant has been permit-
ted to try to benefit from Witness' assertion of the privilege, none has had to decide whether to
testify to contrast his openness with Witness' silence. Defendants have nonetheless testified (for
example, Bowles).
183. Compare Adams v. United States, 287 F.2d 701, 702 (5th Cir. 1961) (defendant convicted of
perjury for his alibi testimony in his earlier robbery prosecution) with United States v. Nash, 447
F.2d 1382, 1385 (4th Cir. 1971) (double jeopardy clause prevented prosecution of defendant for
committing perjury in her earlier mail theft prosecution because jury must have resolved conflicting
stories in her favor).
184. Inadmissible evidence, such as other acts committed by Witness or Witness' bad character,
might convince a court of the relevancy of the privilege assertion. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (other
acts), 405 (bad character), 608 (bad character).
185. The defense may need to disclose to overcome an evidentiary objection based on prejudice,
see supra Part II.D., or as part of a new model of admissibility, see infra Part V.
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two had created. Witness risks being erroneously convicted of the substan-
tive charge.
If these risks do not drain Defendant and Witness' interest in fabricating
evidence, the prosecution can uncover any collusion by granting use immu-
nity to Witness and forcing him to testify. The prosecution has no reason to
withhold immunity if it suspects collusion. If Witness testifies truthfully
once immunized, Defendant is undone. If he lies in claiming sole responsibil-
ity, he risks being charged with perjury.' 86 Also, by lying, Witness sharpens
the prosecution's interest in prosecuting him for the substantive crime if the
jury eventually acquits Defendant.
The possibility of collusion in a single-culprit crime is thus nothing but a
specter. Nor is it a problem in multi-culprit crimes. A person who is
charged with or suspected of having committed the crime with which De-
fendant is charged does not choose to assert the fifth amendment because of
collusion with Defendant. He does so because of self interest.187 If such a
person is guilty, his admissions would ensure his conviction in his own trial;
if innocent, his testimony would likely reveal circumstantial evidence that
would be useful to the government in its prosecution of him. Even if acquit-
ted prior to Defendant's trial, Witness has reason to assert the privilege to
limit the risk of further prosecution. 188
Although it is possible for coparticipants to collude, it is improbable that
they will do so. If they do collude, each will imply sole responsibility for the
crime when asserting the privilege in the other's separate trial. Defendant-i,
for example, will claim that he is innocent and that Defendant-2 is guilty.
Underscoring this claim will be Defendant-2's assertion of the privilege when
called by Defendant-1 in the latter's trial. This scheme obviously depends
upon obtaining a severance. Defendant-2 will never agree to let Defendant-I
accuse him of sole responsibility if the two are being prosecuted together:
that accusation would help Defendant-1 but would doom Defendant-2. With
their prosecutions severed, however, Defendant-i can call (former) Defend-
ant-2 with the expectation that Defendant-2 will invoke the privilege rather
than counter Defendant-l's accusation. Defendant-i, acquitted in his trial
when the jury exaggerates the importance of Defendant-2's assertion, will
return in Defendant-2's trial to testify that he is guilty and that Defendant-2
is not.
Several points make it improbable that two defendants could collude suc-
186. Use immunity does not foreclose prosecution for perjury. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1982).
187. See supra Part II.c.
188. United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir. 1973), discussed supra in text accompany-
ing notes 119-20, presented the inverse of this point: there, the Witness had pleaded guilty but
could still assert the privilege.
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cessfully in the way described. First, it is not easy to obtain a severance, 189
and without a severance the defendants would act foolishly in accusing one
another. Second, even if their prosecutions were severed, it is far from cer-
tain that one could force the other to assert the fifth amendment in the first's
trial. De Luna v. United States 190 provides one of the few glimmers of hope
for these defendants. The defendants in that case were charged with possess-
ing a packet of marijuana that Gomez had thrown out of an automobile win-
dow. In his testimony at their joint trial, Gomez placed the blame solely on
de Luna by claiming he had not known the contents of the package that de
Luna had handed to him for disposal.191 Gomez's attorney did not call de
Luna to testify, but tried in summation to buttress his client's defense by
contrasting Gomez's willingness to testify with de Luna's refusal. Gomez
was acquitted; de Luna, convicted.
De Luna's conviction was reversed when the court of appeals unanimously
held that the fifth amendment forbade comment by anyone on a defendant's
decision not to testify. Almost parenthetically, two of the judges added that
Gomez's sixth amendment right of confrontation authorized his attorney to
comment on de Luna's silence. 192 The court's solution to this constitutional
impasse was to sever the prosecutions. Although the majority in De Luna
did not explicitly say that if the prosecutions had been severed, Gomez could
have forced de Luna to assert the privilege before Gomez's jury, this is surely
the implication of the decision. 93 In later decisions, courts have grudgingly
189. Under rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Defendant-i must show, among
other things, that Defendant-2 would testify if their prosecutions were severed, that Defendant-2's
testimony would exculpate him, and that he needs Defendant-2's testimony. See W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, supra note 142, § 17.2(c); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL
§ 225 (2d ed. 1982); see generally Joinder and Severance, in Project, Eighteenth Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure, 77 GEO. L.J. 774-85 (1989) (by M. Yost). Moreover, to demonstrate that
Defendant-2 would exculpate Defendant-i, Defendant-i must show that Defendant-2 had made
such a statement "before there was a motive to offer it... for the purpose of obtaining a severance
... or for the purpose of obtaining judicially granted immunity." United States v. Stout, 499 F.
Supp. 605, 607 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (citations omitted). Ironically, if Defendant-I could truly satisfy
that burden, he would not need to try to benefit from Defendant-2's assertion because Defendant-2
would testify in Defendant-I's trial.
190. 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962).
191. Reciprocating in final argument, de Luna's attorney claimed that Gomez alone was guilty
because the police saw Gomez pitch the package but did not see de Luna touch it. Id. at 142.
192. Id. at 143 (Brown & Wisdom, JJ.). A defendant's right of compulsory process provides
better support for this conclusion, unless the majority thought that the accusation by de Luna's
attorney meant that Gomez had a right to "confront" de Luna.
Concurring in the result, Judge Bell disagreed with the majority's belief that a defendant could
adversely comment on a codefendant's failure to testify. However, he did think that an attorney
could comment favorably on his client's decision to testify. Id. at 155 (Bell, J., concurring
specially).
193. In rejecting a motion for rehearing, the majority noted that a "co-defendant's right to com-
ment is not tangential but is an essential, if complicating, element in the problem" of how to protect
the codefendant. De Luna v. United States, 324 F.2d 375, 376 (5th Cir. 1963) (per curiam). It
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accepted the premise in De Luna that one defendant can comment on the
refusal of another to testify. But, they have limited the right to comment to
facts closely resembling those in De Luna. A defendant has no right to com-
ment simply because he testifies and his codefendant does not. 194
If codefendants do obtain a severance, other problems remain. Despite De
Luna's implicit holding that Defendant-2's assertion of the privilege is rele-
vant, other courts may disagree and not allow Defendant-2 to appear. 195
More importantly, Defendant-i, who calls Defendant-2 to assert the privi-
lege, risks being charged with perjury. Defendant-1 almost surely must tes-
tify that he is innocent at his own trial, as Gomez did in De Luna. This
would create a vivid contrast between the willingness of the two to testify. If
Defendant-I lies in testifying that he is innocent, he probably could be prose-
cuted for perjury. 196 Defendant-2 runs the same risk in his later trial if he
testifies and Defendant-1 asserts the privilege. Moreover, if Defendant-1 as-
serts the privilege at Defendant-2's trial, the prosecution could unmask any
collusion and damn Defendant-2 by granting use immunity to Defendant-1.
Granted use immunity, Defendant-1 must repeat his accusation from his
own trial that Defendant-2 was the sole culprit or risk being charged with
perjury in this second way. If Defendant-1 does not testify in his own prose-
cution and nonetheless somehow convinces the jury to acquit, he can testify
in Defendant-2's trial that he alone was responsible. With this dramatic con-
fession by Defendant-l, Defendant-2 may choose not to testify, and thus
would not risk being charged with perjury. But if Defendant-1 lies in claim-
ing that he acted alone, he could risk being charged with perjury in yet an-
other way.
F. THE UNIMPORTANCE OF SYMMETRY
No inference may be drawn against a defendant when a prosecution wit-
ness invokes the fifth amendment to questions designed to chain the defend-
ant to the crime. The reason is not the irrelevancy of the witness'
recognized that a "procedural difficult[y] inherent in [its] decision" was the problem we are discuss-
ing: the possibility that codefendants would conspire "to promote a mistrial by having one of them
comment upon the failure of another co-defendant to testify." Id.
194. The positions of the defendants must be "mutually exclusive." United States v. Kahn, 381
F.2d 824, 841 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1015 (1967) (no right to severance or to comment
when Defendant-i claims he was the innocent dupe of Defendant-2, and the latter claims he acted
in good faith); United States v. De La Cruz Bellinger, 422 F.2d 723, 727 (9th Cir.) (same result
when Defendant-I claimed alibi, and Defendant-2, caught with the contraband, claimed no knowl-
edge), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 942 (1970).
Thus, De Luna might help a Defendant in a case like Beye, in which each accused the other of
sole complicity, but not in a case like Johnson, in which Defendant claimed Witness would exoner-
ate him.
195. See supra Part II.c.
196. See supra note 183.
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assertion, 197 but the defendant's inability to cross-examine. This rule was
constitutionally enthroned in 1965 when, in Douglas v. Alabama,198 the
Supreme Court shook awake the defendant's slumbering sixth amendment
right to confrontation. 199 Because the defendant has this protection, should
the prosecution similarly have it when Defendant calls Witness? Courts
sometimes imply that as a formal matter, the prosecution should be treated
the same way as the defendant, 2°° and thus protected from having an infer-
ence drawn in Defendant's favor. But if symmetry is pleasing elsewhere (as,
say, in Palladian architecture), it is inappropriate in this context. 20'
Courts do not identify, let alone justify, why we need to shackle Defendant
as Douglas shackles the prosecution. There are several possibilities; however,
none is convincing. The first is a deduction from the global rule that no
party in any litigation can benefit from the assertion of any privilege by any-
197. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
198. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
199. Id. at 418 (through the ruse of trying to refresh witness' recollection, prosecutor questioned
him about confession during which he had implicated defendant).
Although courts threaten to reverse convictions after the prosecutor has called a witness with the
intent of benefitting from the assertion of the fifth amendment, see United States v. Namet, 373 U.S.
179, 186-87 (1963), they have not tethered the prosecution as tightly as one might expect. The
courts have rather casually inspected whether the prosecution knew the witness would assert the
privilege, and have been quick to find that any constitutional error was harmless. See generally
Annotation, Prejudicial Effect of Prosecution's Calling as Witness, to Extract a Self-Incrimination
Privilege, One Involved in Offense with which Accused is Charged, 86 A.L.R.2D 1443 (1962). An
example is Busby v. Holt, 771 F.2d 1461 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), withdrawn in part, 781 F.2d
1475 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1068 (1986). The witness had been charged in
a separate indictment with helping the defendant kill the defendant's husband. Contending it was a
"close question" whether he could force the witness to assert the privilege before the defendant's
jury, the prosecutor claimed he could do so to forestall the defense from arguing that the jury could
draw an inference in the defendant's favor from the prosecution's failure to call that witness. Id. at
1465 n.5. Of course, it was not a "close question": one could easily find that the prosecutor had
committed "misconduct" by "conscious[ly] and flagrant[ly] attempt[ing] to build its case out of
inferences arising from the use of the testimonial privilege." Namet, 373 U.S. at 186. In Namet,
too, the Court did not reverse even though the prosecutor knew the witnesses would invoke the fifth
amendment to certain questions he asked. The prosecutor in Busby misunderstood or misconstrued
the law. The court of appeals found that having this witness assert the privilege to questions linking
him, and implicitly the defendant, to the murder, was constitutional error. Nonetheless, it used the
conviction-saving device of harmless error because it thought the error was in the defendant's in-
ability to cross-examine the witness, not in the prosecutor's misconduct. 781 F.2d at 1476.
Cases like Busby demonstrate the need to establish a way to review what should be done when a
person wants to assert the fifth amendment (or any privilege, for that matter) regardless of which
side calls that person as a witness. For a model approach to take, see supra Parts II.c. and II.D
(balancing relevancy and prejudice).
200. See United States v. Belled, 184 F.2d 394, 398 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (no inference can be drawn
from a witness' assertion of the fifth amendment privilege). In Bowles, the majority also noted this
general rule, and reinforced it by adding the reasons of relevancy, prejudice, and collusion. 439
F.2d at 541-42.
201. See Commonwealth v. Green, 445 Pa. 228, 233, 285 A.2d 865, 868 (1971) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing majority for using the "hobgoblin of symmetry" to deny defendant the right
to call witness).
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one. Proposed rule 513 of the Federal Rules of Evidence would have created
such a blunderbuss rule.20 2 To defend this proposed rule, the Standing Com-
mittee of the Judicial Conference built upon Griffin v. California, 203 in which
the Supreme Court held that adverse comment by the prosecutor (or by the
judge) constitutes a cost that the defendant should not be required to con-
sider in deciding whether to testify. Inflating the Court's analysis of a consti-
tutional fifth amendment right,2°4 the Standing Committee applied this cost
analysis to every privilege. All privileges, the Standing Committee observed,
are "founded upon important policies and are [thus] entitled to maximum
effect.",205
Whether one agrees with the cost analysis or not, in our context the con-
cern over cost is irrelevant. Defendant invokes no privilege; he merely wants
Witness to testify (or at least to invoke the privilege before the jury).20 6 In-
deed, Defendant will incur a cost only if Witness does not appear before the
jury and the jury, puzzled by why Witness does not testify, discounts De-
fendant's evidence of Witness' guilt. Witness, the privilege holder, suffers no
legal harm by invoking the privilege before the jury, as a criminal defendant
would if the jury were invited to draw inferences against him from his refusal
to testify. 207 Thus, comment by Defendant on Witness' assertion does not
"cut[ ] down on the privilege by making its assertion costly. ' 20 8 The cost
concern is irrelevant and overbroad in our context.
A second possible basis for applying a no-inference rule to Defendant in-
volves extending to the prosecution Douglas v. Alabama's protection for the
criminal defendant. The prosecution, like the defendant, is entitled to a "fair
trial," as courts have baldly and shrilly announced. 20 9 Yet, to say that there
202. PROPOSED FED. R. EvID. 513(a) (1974) ("The claim of a privilege... is not a proper
subject of comment by judge or counsel. No inference may be drawn therefrom.").
203. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
204. Id. at 614.
205. PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 513(a) advisory committee's note (1974).
206. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that Defendant ostensibly wants Witness to testify.
Rather than risking that Witness would truthfully or falsely explain evidence that circumstantially
incriminates Witness, Defendant might prefer that Witness assert the fifth amendment. We can
ignore this sort of tactical assessment, however. See supra note 104.
207. See infra Part II.G.
208. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965), quoted in PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 513(a)
advisory committee's note (1974).
209. See People v. Dikeman, 192 Colo. 1, 555 P.2d 519 (1976). In overturning a decision that
had permitted Defendant to force Witness to assert the privilege before the jury, O'Chiato v. People,
73 Colo. 192, 214 P. 404 (1923), the court in Dikeman announced that
[i]t is a rudimentary proposition of law that a criminal trial must be a fair trial not only for
a defendant but also for the People. Neither the prosecution nor the defense therefore has
the right to deliberately and unfairly benefit from any speculative inferences the jury
might draw simply from a witness' assertions of the [fifth amendment] privilege.
192 Colo. at 4, 555 P.2d at 521.
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"is no reason [to distinguish] Douglas on the basis that the party calling the
witness [is] the government,"' 21° suggests a failure to examine closely the re-
spective positions of Defendant and the prosecution.
The defendant cannot supersede any person's privilege and force that per-
son to testify. However, the prosecution can dismantle Witness' fifth amend-
ment protection by granting him use immunity. If the prosecution does not
grant use immunity to Witness, it deprives the factfinder of evidence in the
same way as a defendant does by not calling his spouse to testify, 211 or by
persuading a witness to invoke a personal privilege. 212 Yet, in these latter
situations, the jury can draw an inference for the prosecution based on the
defendant's decision to silence the witness' voice.213 Thus, when the prosecu-
tion does not strip Witness of his fifth amendment protection, why cannot
the jury have the option of drawing an inference for Defendant? The ques-
tion may be more easily answered affirmatively now that the prosecution has
the power to grant use immunity and no longer needs to grant transactional
immunity.214 Unlike use immunity, which protects Witness from the use by
the prosecutor of the testimony or its fruits, transactional immunity protects
the witness from prosecution for any crime he mentions in testifying.21 5 But,
even extending the greater protection of transactional immunity to Witness
hurts the prosecution only in multi-culprit crimes in which the prosecutor
wants to prosecute both Defendant and Witness. 216 This concern does not
210. State v. Smith, 74 Wash. 2d 744, 750, 446 P.2d 571, 581 (1969) (en bane), overruled, 85
Wash. 2d 758, 539 P.2d 680 (1975).
211. See Commonwealth v. Spencer, 212 Mass. 438, 451-52, 99 N.E. 266, 271-72 (1912) (defend-
ant's failure to call wife to testify in his favor is proper subject for comment by prosecutor; however,
if called she could have refused to testify and no comment or inference could have been made
against defendant).
212. See State v. Harper, 33 Or. 524, 527, 55 P. 1075, 1076 (1899) (in absence of collusion, it is
improper for prosecution to argue that jury can draw inference against defendant from witness'
refusal to testify), overruled sub nom. State v. Abbot, 275 Or. 611, 552 P.2d 238 (1976).
213. If the defendant does not control whether the witness testifies, no inference can be drawn
against him. See Spencer, 212 Mass. at 452, 99 N.E.2d at 272 (dictum) (wrong to draw inference
against defendant when spouse invoked the husband-wife communication privilege).
214. United States v. Kastigar, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972).
215. Id.
216. Nonetheless, the prosecution has offered transactional immunity even to a co-indictee to
extract his testimony against the defendant. See Washburn v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 448, 299
S.W.2d 706 (1956). In the unlikely event that in a multi-culprit crime, Witness might want to
testify to exculpate Defendant, the threat of prosecution may terrorize him into invoking the privi-
lege instead. This threat poses no problem when the prosecution is already prosecuting Witness, as
may happen in multi-culprit crimes in which Witness is suspected of having participated with De-
fendant. But the prosecution could induce Witness to invoke the fifth amendment by manipulating
its charging authority. For example, it might refuse to include in a plea bargain all of the indict-
ments in which Witness is charged. It might not dismiss the remaining counts in an indictment
when Witness pleads guilty to one charge. Cf United States v. Roberts, 503 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir.
1974), cert denied, 419 U.S. 113 (1975) (codefendant who pleaded guilty to one count asserted fifth
amendment because five counts remained against him). Or, the prosecution might refuse to promise
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apply in single-culprit crimes, because the prosecution has selected Defend-
ant as its candidate for the culprit.
Indeed, the prosecution's monopoly over granting immunity exposes the
irony of valuing symmetry so as to prevent Defendant from benefitting from
Witness' assertion simply because the prosecution cannot benefit in the in-
verse setting. The prosecution has refused every defendant's demand that it
grant use immunity to a defense witness; it has done this by successfully
arguing that its burden of proof and its responsibility to decide whom to
prosecute justify letting it alone decide when to grant use immunity. 217 Yet,
the prosecution should not have it both ways-able to grant use immunity to
its witnesses and withhold use immunity from defense witnesses. There is
reason, then, to treat Defendant differently from the prosecution.
The strident judicial language about the need for symmetry also masks an
important assumption about the relation between the defendant's right to
confrontation and his right to introduce evidence through the compulsory
process and due process clauses. The defendant's right to introduce evi-
dence, the courts seem to assume, is a function of the prosecution's ability to
introduce evidence. The defendant can introduce whatever evidence the
prosecution can, but no more. Conversely, the prosecution can exclude any
evidence the defendant offers that the confrontation clause would prevent it
from introducing.
Such a model of the defendant's two sixth amendment rights is irrelevant
and inaccurate. It is irrelevant because, as noted earlier, there is an imbal-
ance in the ability to obtain testimony from a witness who invokes the fifth
amendment: the prosecution can force the witness to testify by granting use
immunity; the defendant lacks that power. The model is inaccurate because
it underestimates the defendant's ability to exclude and admit evidence.
Wielding the confrontation clause, the defendant may be able to exclude
hearsay evidence that is otherwise admissible through a hearsay exception
fashioned by the particular jurisdiction.218
not to seek new charges against Witness for his participation in the event about which Defendant
wishes him to testify. Cf Commonwealth v. Francis, 375 Mass. 211, 212-13, 375 N.E.2d 1221,
1222-23 (1978) (codefendant who pleaded guilty to substantive count asserted fifth amendment for
fear prosecution might indict him for conspiring with Defendant).
217. See United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 774-75 (2d Cir. 1980) (substantial burdens and
restrictions assumed by prosecution, such as burden of proof, unanimous verdict requirement, in-
ability to compel defendant to testify, inability to exclude exculpatory evidence, and inability to
retry defendant after acquittal, justify the asymmetrical power to grant use immunity), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1077 (1981).
218. Thus, the defendants could use the hearsay exception whereas the prosecution could not.
The confrontation clause also enables a defendant to surmount evidentiary exclusionary rules to
obtain evidence that the prosecution cannot. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974) (con-
frontation clause enables defendant to overcome a privilege protecting a juvenile, called as a witness
by the prosecution, from revealing his criminal record and current probationary status).
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To satisfy the confrontation clause, the prosecution must establish that the
hearsay declarant is unavailable and that the hearsay is reliable. 219 In our
context, assuming that the confrontation clause's requirements apply when
the prosecution calls a witness who will assert the fifth amendment,220 the
prosecution would fail to meet the unavailability test, and probably the relia-
bility test as well.
By asserting the fifth amendment, a witness becomes unavailable. 22' But
the witness is only nominally unavailable; the prosecution, with its authority
to grant use immunity, controls whether the witness remains unavailable. It
is senseless to permit the prosecution simultaneously to claim that the wit-
ness is unavailable and refuse to bestow use immunity upon him.
An assertion of the fifth amendment by a prosecution witness in a sus-
pected multi-culprit crime probably also flunks the reliability test. Even as-
suming that the witness' assertion of the privilege is relevant to the
defendant's guilt,222 the confrontation clause demands that the evidence be
reliable, not .simply relevant. Because the witness will himself be suspected of
having participated in the crime, the witness will be anxious to assert the
privilege whether or not he is guilty or knows of the defendant's complic-
ity.223 Thus, inferring that such a witness has confirmed the defendant's guilt
by asserting the fifth amendment is not accurate enough to satisfy the con-
frontation clause's reliability test.
Furthermore, the defendant's right to introduce evidence through the
compulsory process and due process clauses enables him to trump eviden-
tiary exclusionary rules that bar the prosecution from introducing the same
sort of evidence.224 The confrontation clause protects the defendant, not the
219. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
220. Assertion of the fifth amendment might be treated as hearsay on the assumption that the
witness has implicitly "assertd" that by answering the questions truthfully, he would link the de-
fendant and himself to the crime. See J. MAGUIRE, supra note 63, § 2.061, at 49. Whether the
assertion is treated as hearsay or not, the requirements of the confrontation clause seem to apply
because the defendant cannot cross-examine the witness who asserts the privilege, just as he cannot
cross-examine an unavailable hearsay declarant.
221. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1) ("unavailability" includes situations in which the witness is
exempt from testifying on grounds of privilege).
222. See supra note 121; see also J. WIGMORE, supra note 88, § 2272, at 410 ("The inference, as a
mere matter of logic, is not only possible but inherent, and cannot be denied."). But cf Beach v.
United States, 46 F. 754 (N.D. Cal. 1890) (seemingly not relevant).
223. Although the point is so obvious that illustration seems unnecessary, consider Busby v.
Holt, 771 F.2d 1461 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), withdrawn in part, 781 F.2d 1475 (1lth Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1068 (1986) (discussed supra note 199). In that case, the alleged
coparticipant whom the prosecution called to testify asserted the fifth amendment to questions ask-
ing no more than whether he knew the defendant.
224. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298-303 (1973) (due process clause enables de-
fendant to introduce unavailable declarant's hearsay statement against penal interest when State has
no exception for that sort of hearsay).




For all these reasons, the rights of the prosecution and the defendant to
introduce and to exclude evidence are simply not symmetrical. The rule
against drawing an inference from the assertion of a privilege in favor of a
party is therefore overinclusive as it applies to Defendant.
G. THE WITNESS' INTEREST
A final evidentiary issue is whether Witness has a legal interest that must
be considered in deciding whether to let Defendant try to benefit from Wit-
ness' assertion of the fifth amendment. When Witness is a codefendant (or a
suspected coparticipant), he has such a legal interest: the fifth amendment
protects him from being called as a witness by any party and from having his
refusal to testify be the subject of comment by any party.
In a single-culprit crime, however, Witness has no legal interest that war-
rants evaluation. Publicly asserting the fifth amendment in Defendant's trial
will no doubt embarrass Witness, and may affect other aspects of his life.225
Yet, Witness is hapless: if properly subpoenaed, he must appear to testify
and must assert the privilege in the arena that the judge chooses (in or out of
the presence or hearing of the jury). Here, Witness' legal protections are
limited to: (1) the right to remain silent,226 and (2) the right to prevent the
prosecution from using his assertion against him as substantive evidence or
as a basis to impeach him were he later to testify at his own prosecution (if
Defendant were acquitted and Witness prosecuted for the same crime). 227
H. SUMMARY
This analysis of the evidentiary issues indicates that we should let Defend-
ant try to benefit from Witness' exercise of the privilege, at least in single-
culprit crimes. Through a pretrial hearing, the court can determine whether
Witness' assertion is relevant. With advance notice of Defendant's intent to
call Witness, the prosecution will have the opportunity to investigate Wit-
300. Whether a defendant must demonstrate that the evidence bears "persuasive assurances of
reliability" remains unclear. In Chambers, the Court might have wanted to erect a high threshold
because at that time few jurisdictions, including the federal courts, had adopted a hearsay exception
for statements against penal interest. Moreover, statements against penal interest may constitute a
special sort of evidence demanding closer inspection than other types of hearsay, as suggested by the
uniquely high corroboration requirement included in the federal exception. See FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(3). Thus, with other sorts of evidence, the courts might either impose a lower reliability
burden or, as argued in Part V, infra, permit the defendant to introduce evidence as long as the
prosecution has the opportunity to investigate its reliability.
225. One attorney told the author that his client feared being fired from his work if his employer
learned he had asserted the privilege. Conversation with attorney in Washington, D.C. (1984).
226. In contrast, the prosecution in Canada can force Witness to testify, although it cannot use
his testimony against him. See supra note 11.
227. See United States v. Grunewald, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
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ness' complicity and the possibility that Witness and Defendant have col-
luded. The court can position the jury to evaluate the significance of
Witness' assertion by staging Witness' appearance before the jury and by
comment. The prosecution's evidentiary objections should therefore be
rejected.
Yet, the analysis is not at an end. Courts may reject one of the linchpins of
the analysis-that they must closely inspect the facts of the case, that they
should not use a categorical rule forbidding the factfinder from drawing any
inference from the assertion of privilege, that they should overrule the prose-
cution's prejudice objection if the prosecution has had the opportunity to
investigate Witness' assertion, or that they should help the jury as extensively
as has been proposed in Part II.D. As a result, Part IV examines whether
Defendant has a constitutional right to try to benefit from Witness' assertion.
Given the uncertain constitutional outcome, Part V explores whether to
adopt a new model of evidentiary admissibility for the criminal defendant.
Before these inquiries, however, we need to ask whether there is another way
to prod Witness to testify.
III. LEARNING WHAT WITNESS HIDES BEHIND THE PRIVILEGE
The inference that Witness is guilty and that Defendant is not is almost
irresistible when the crime was committed by only one person and Witness
asserts the fifth amendment. Yet, a rational juror could also draw other in-
ferences from that assertion. And, if forced to testify, Witness might
staunchly deny culpability while simultaneously confirming the existence of
circumstantial evidence of his sole guilt. The jury's inability to learn the
reasons for Witness' assertion could lead it to err in concluding that Defend-
ant is innocent and that Witness is probably guilty.
To improve the factfinding process beyond the use of the hearing described
in Part II.D, Witness should testify. Witness will not testify, however, unless
the pursuit of some tactical advantage leads the prosecution to grant use im-
munity. Given this dilemma, there are two ways to increase the likelihood
that the information Witness hides behind the assertion would benefit De-
fendant if known. First, in a radical move, the court could strip Witness of
his fifth amendment protection and force him to testify. More modestly,
Witness could be required to answer questions about his complicity in an ex
parte, in camera hearing.
A. FORCING WITNESS TO TESTIFY
Perhaps surprisingly, forcing Witness to testify before the jury and protect-
ing him from use of his testimony is not at odds with the current interpreta-
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tion of the fifth amendment.228 If the fifth amendment ever created a
"private enclave" 229 from which the government could not force us to ven-
ture, it no longer does so. Instead, the Supreme Court has been marching
toward the position that the prosecution can coerce one to disgorge physical
evidence as long as this is not the only way to authenticate that evidence, 230
or to testify as long as that testimony and its fruits cannot be used as evi-
dence against the witness. 231 A witness desperate to remain silent risks being
held in contempt for rejecting the prosecution's munificent grant of use im-
munity. Thus, Witness is not harmed, at least in the constitutional sense, by
being forced to testify.
The prosecution is harmed if the court grants use immunity only in multi-
culprit crimes. In prosecuting a witness who has testified under a grant of
use immunity, the prosecution must obtain its evidence independently of the
witness' testimony. This burden is irrelevant in a single-culprit crime be-
cause the prosecution does not need to protect its right to prosecute Witness
if Defendant is acquitted. 232 This burden is important in multi-culprit
crimes, however, because Witness shares billing with Defendant as a code-
fendant or as a possible coparticipant yet uncharged. Satisfying that burden
might be difficult if the prosecution wants to try Defendant before it tries the
coparticipant, or if it has not yet completed its investigation of the copartici-
pant by the point when he is to testify at Defendant's trial.233 Thus, granting
use immunity to a coparticipant might cripple, or at least disrupt, the prose-
cution's effort to convict all of the culprits.234
228. It is also the approach taken in Canada. See supra note 11.
229. United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). For the Court's other metaphors of place to describe the fifth amend-
ment's protection, see, eg., United States v. Couch, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973) ("private inner sanc-
tum of individual feeling and thought"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) ("zone
of privacy").
230. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 613-15 (1984). In Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S.
463 (1976), and Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the Court had left open the slim
possibility that the fifth amendment protected against disclosure of private papers. Although in Doe
the Court did not explicitly eliminate this possibility, Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion
said that it had been eliminated by implication. 465 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
231. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972).
232. If the prosecution does choose to prosecute Witness, it can use against him the evidence
collected by Defendant. The prosecution can also resurrect any evidence of Witness' guilt that it
had collected before deciding to prosecute Defendant. Cf Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
288 (1973) (State prosecuted Chambers only after its prosecution of McDonald (Witness) had been
dismissed at preliminary examination stage).
233. Filing a list of its evidence under seal with the court would not help. See United States v.
Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1980) (defendant's request to have immunity granted to defense
witness denied when prosecution had not completed its investigation of that witness).
234. Nonetheless, after learning why the prosecution opposed forcing Witness to testify, one
could balance its interests against Defendant's need for Witness' testimony. Cf RULES FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL 704(e) (1984) (court can order grant of use immunity or can abate proceedings if
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At least in single-culprit crimes, then, courts should override Witness'
privilege assertion to force him to testify. However, there is scant chance
that courts will do this. The argument that they should is disingenuous be-
cause it hides the critical point: if courts were to override Witness' privilege
assertion, they would do what they have doggedly refused to do-grant use
immunity to a witness over the prosecution's objection. Curtly claiming to
lack inherent authority to grant immunity, 235 courts reason that only the
legislature has the authority to grant it, and that legislatures have transferred
their authority to the office of the prosecutor in the executive branch.236
B. FORCING WITNESS TO DISCLOSE IN AN EX PARTE, IN CAMERA
HEARING
Rather than adopting the more radical approach of forcing Witness to tes-
tify before the jury, courts could conduct an ex parte, in camera hearing,
with only Witness and his counsel present, to learn why Witness refuses to
testify. The defense and prosecution would prepare questions for the judge
to ask Witness.237 If Witness incriminated himself, the judge could readily
find that his assertion of the privilege before the jury would be relevant. If
Witness did not incriminate himself, the judge could force him to testify
before the jury. In either event, the judge would seal the record of the hear-
Defendant can prove that Witness' testimony "would be of such central importance to the defend-
ant's case that it is essential to a fair trial").
235. United States v. L'Hoste, 640 F.2d 693, 695 (5th Cir. 1981).
236. Id. at 695. Nor have courts interpreted the defendant's sixth amendment and due process
rights to include a right to override privileges. See Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One
Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture of Another, 66 IowA L. REV. 741, 770 (1981). Overriding a
witness' fifth amendment privilege makes more sense than overriding other privileges because the
former does not protect the witness from being forced to testify, only from the use of that testimony.
For arguments on both sides of the constitutional issue, compare Westen, Confrontation and Com-
pulsory Process: A Unified Theory for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 581 n.38 (1978)
[hereinafter Westen, Unified Theory] (Defendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory process
empowers court to conduct in camera hearing and to force prosecution to choose between overrid-
ing privilege (although perhaps not the fifth amendment) or dropping prosecution) with Hill, supra
note 174, at 1185-90 & n.65 (neither case law nor policy supports forcing witness to disclose privi-
leged information in camera). Siding with Professor Westen, I would go further and override the
witness' fifth amendment privilege as well. His reservation about overriding the fifth amendment
privilege seems to stem from concern that the witness' disclosures would leak from the in camera
hearing and that the prosecution would as a result have difficulty establishing the independence of
its evidence. See Westen, Unified Theory, supra, at 581 n.38. However, the prosecution's interest in
protecting its evidence for use against Witness is insignificant, at least in single-culprit crimes.
237. Although defense counsel might want to attend and participate in the hearing, counsel's
submission of a list of questions should suffice to enable the court to question carefully and ade-
quately. Cf United States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1049 (5th Cir. 1976) (in the absence
of defense counsel, the court conducted a hearing with a witness and learned that his fear of incrimi-
nating himself was not properly based). The prosecution would want to avoid attending the hearing
to reduce its burden of showing that it had gathered its evidence of Witness' guilt, if it chose to
prosecute him, independently of his statements to the judge.
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ing to protect Witness (and the prosecution, were it later accused of using the
information to prosecute Witness).
This proposal will draw fire, too, even though courts conduct similar hear-
ings to determine whether others sorts of privileges apply.238 Its effect would
be a judicial grant of use immunity to Witness in the rare event that his
disclosures leaked from the hearing, a grant we know courts resolutely op-
pose. More importantly, as long as courts believe they lack the institutional
or constitutional authority to grant use immunity, they would not want to
learn what Witness would say. What could the judge do if, in an in camera
hearing, Witness brazenly or tearfully conceded that he and not Defendant
had committed the crime? Motivated to reveal Witness' stunning admission,
the judge would lack a way to disclose. Defendant has no right to strip a
privilege from Witness. 239 Nor is Witness' fifth amendment privilege the sort
that permits the court to learn the privileged information while fashioning a
remedy for the nondisclosure of the information.240 As a result, it is unlikely
that courts will adopt this ostensibly modest proposal to decide whether De-
fendant or Witness is guilty.
Because courts will not prod Witness into testifying, we must consider
whether Defendant has a constitutional right to try to benefit from Witness'
assertion. If that too fails, we must explore whether to adopt a different
model of evidentiary admissibility for the criminal defendant.
IV. A CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT
If evidence law is properly interpreted, Defendant will not need to resort
to constitutional law to try to benefit from Witness' assertion, at least in a
single-culprit crime. Nonetheless, dredging constitutional doctrine becomes
important if courts remain unpersuaded by analysis of evidence law in Part
II. Defendant can jerry-build a constitutional argument. 241 Convincing
courts to accept it is another matter, in no small part because the Supreme
238. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (executive privilege); Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970) (attorney-client communications), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 974 (1971); see also PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 509 (1974) (secrets of state), 510 (identity of
informant).
239. See Commonwealth v. Sims, 513 Pa. 366, 374-75, 521 A.2d 391, 394-95 (1987) (defendant
cannot overcome attorney-client privilege to force client to testify).
240. See PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 509(e) (1974) (if the prosecution invokes its "secrets of state"
privilege, the court can strike the testimony of a witness, declare a mistrial, or dismiss the action),
510(c)(2) (prosecution may be forced to choose between dismissing the prosecution and revealing
the identify of an informant).
241. There is a better-built model than the one discussed in the text. On this model, the due
process clause would give a defendant the right to introduce relevant evidence (and to exclude
irrelevant evidence). As a constitutional matter, evidence is relevant unless it is "so inherently
unreliable that it cannot rationally be evaluated." Westen, supra note 10, at 157. The compulsory
process clause would require the state to help the defendant try to find evidence. See Westen,
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Court has failed to explain the content of the defendant's right to introduce
evidence under the due process and compulsory process clauses, or the rela-
tion between these two clauses.242 Nonetheless, the Court seems to say that a
jurisdiction cannot arbitrarily exclude defense evidence that is relevant, ma-
terial, and trustworthy, whether the source of this rule is the due process or
compulsory process clause.243 Of these requirements, the stumbling block
for Defendant will be establishing that Witness' assertion is trustworthy, if
trustworthiness is in fact a separate test.
A. ARBITRARY EXCLUSION
A jurisdiction acts arbitrarily in adopting "rules that prevent whole cate-
gories of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori characteri-
zations that presume them unworthy of belief."'244 In our context, courts act
arbitrarily by using the no-inference rule, by insisting upon symmetry in the
introduction of evidence by the prosecution and the defense, and by unreflec-
tively holding that Witness' assertion is irrelevant, prejudicial, and collusive.
A jurisdiction can save its rule by demonstrating that the rule excludes
unreliable evidence. Unfortunately, the Court has not explained how a juris-
diction can satisfy that burden. Must the trial court inspect defense-offered
evidence excluded by the rule to determine whether the purpose of excluding
that type of evidence (unreliability) applies to the defendant's evidence? Or
(and?), must the trial court search for ways to protect the jurisdiction's inter-
est other than by excluding the evidence?
Under the first interpretation of arbitrariness in the context of the confron-
tation clause, the trial court must scour the facts of the case before permit-
Unified Theory, supra note 236, at 589. The compulsory process clause, however, would not add to
the test of relevancy a separate test of reliability as a condition of introducing evidence.
On this model, Defendant could force Witness to assert the privilege before the jury. Witness'
assertion is relevant and the court could help the jury to understand Witness' assertion in the ways
discussed supra in Part II.D.3. The rub, of course, is that the Supreme Court has not accepted this
model and is content instead to muddle along without building a model of these two constitutional
doctrines.
242. For example, in one recent case, Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), the Court said
the compulsory process clause provided no greater protection than the due process clause, but chose
not to discuss the former because its meaning remained "unsettled." Id. at 56.
243. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 54-56 (1987). In other cases, the Court has character-
ized the nature of the evidence as "critical" or "vital" to the defense. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 302 (1973) ("critical"; due process clause analysis); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16
(1967) ("vital"; compulsory process clause analysis).
244. Washington, 388 U.S. at 22 (under compulsory process clause, a rule barring a defendant
from calling a coparticipant as a witness, while permitting the State to call such a witness, is uncon-
stitutional); see also Rock 483 U.S. at 56 (arbitrary to bar from testifying defendant whose memory
had been hypnotically refreshed "in the absence of clear evidence ... repudiating the validity of all
posthypnosis recollections"); Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 (wrong to apply hearsay rule "mechanisti-
cally" to exclude trustworthy hearsay).
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ting the prosecution to introduce evidence or to utilize a presumption.245 In
like fashion, there is support for Defendant's claim that the trial court must
also closely inspect the facts of his case.246 Although there may be reason for
not permitting Defendant to try to benefit from Witness' assertion, 247 by
changing one fact in Chambers v. Mississippi, 248 one can demonstrate that
such a categorical ban is overbroad.
Assume that McDonald asserted the fifth amendment rather than testify-
ing as he did when called as a witness by Chambers. Might the Supreme
Court have refused to permit Chambers to force McDonald to assert the
privilege before the jury? McDonald's assertion would have been relevant
because a rational juror could have inferred that by refusing to answer, Mc-
Donald had conceded that he had accurately confessed that he had a weapon
like the murder weapon, had fled after the crime, and so on.
The one difference between Chambers and our reconstruction of its facts is
that unless the prosecution were to grant use immunity to McDonald under
the changed facts, it could not meaningfully examine him. The State in
Chambers scored in its cross-examination of McDonald: he recanted the
confession he had given to Chambers' attorneys. But we know from the con-
frontation clause cases that the ability to cross-examine is not a condition of
admitting evidence. A finding that the challenged evidence is reliable is a
substitute for cross-examination. 249 Thus, at least as long as the inference of
Witness' guilt or Defendant's innocence seems accurate enough, the categori-
245. Unless the unavailable declarant's hearsay statement fits within a "firmly rooted" exception,
the prosecution must prove that the statement is reliable to satisfy the confrontation clause. See
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 & n.8 (1980). The court must also examine the facts when a
presumption helps the prosecution. If the factfinder must consider all of the evidence before it can
find that the presumed fact exists, the court must find that the presumed fact follows from proof of
the basic facts by a preponderance of the evidence. See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen,
442 U.S. 140, 166 (1979). Presumptions that permit the jury to find the presumed fact from proof
of the basic fact without regard to other evidence in the case must satisfy a higher burden: ex-
amined on their face, the presumed fact must follow from proof of the basic fact beyond a reason-
able doubt. Id. at 167.
246. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 65 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (complaining that the majority
seemed to expect the trial judge to determine whether the concerns posed by hypnotized testimony
applied to the particular defendant).
Congress might have adopted the catch-all hearsay exceptions, FED. R. EvID. 803(24) &
804(b)(5), out of a similar concern that the hearsay rule was overbroad in excluding certain hearsay
statements that fit within no exception.
247. An obvious reason is the efficiency of using a rule that seems to apply to the run of cases,
even if use of the rule would appear overbroad if the time were taken to examine its fit to a particu-
lar case.
248. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). For a discussion of the facts of Chambers, see infra notes 106-08 and
accompanying text.
249. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Indeed, as long as the hearsay comes within a
"firmly rooted" exception, neither cross-examination nor a determination of specific reliability is
required. Id. at 66 n.8 (the "firmly rooted" exceptions are those for dying declarations, prior cross-
examined testimony, and business or public records).
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cal rule prohibiting Defendant from trying to benefit seems arbitrary and
therefore unconstitutional. Having rent the per se bar, we must wait until
the discussion of materiality and trustworthiness to learn how large a tear we
have made.
The second version of arbitrariness asks whether the jurisdiction could as-
suage its concern over jury misestimation in a way other than by excluding
the evidence. 250 As explored in Part II.D, the trial court can employ a vari-
ety of methods to help the jury assess Witness' assertion. It can leech the
drama from Witness' assertion by identifying ahead of time the topics that
Witness will refuse to discuss and forbidding counsel from asking pointed
questions. The court can explain how easy it is for Witness to meet the test
to assert the privilege. It can also identify and rank the inferences that the
jury might draw.
Safeguards such as these might destroy every exclusionary rule that pre-
vents a defendant from introducing evidence. 251 One safeguard that would
not, and that applies specifically to Defendant's plight, is the grant of use
immunity by the prosecution (or the court). Although courts have refused to
force the prosecution to grant use immunity, this second version of arbitrari-
ness suggests that the prosecution should be forced to choose between grant-
ing use immunity and letting the jury puzzle over the significance of Witness'
assertion. 252 Forcing the prosecution to make that choice would roughly
protect its interests, and perhaps Defendant's as well.253 By choosing to
grant use immunity, the prosecution could eliminate the drama created by
Witness' assertion, smoke out any collusion between Witness and Defendant,
and let the jury learn whether Witness would incriminate himself and exon-
erate Defendant. This point applies especially to single-culprit crimes; in
250. The Supreme Court has occasionally implied that we should simply leave to the jury the job
of evaluating the credit and weight of relevant evidence. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22
(1967) (best to "leav[e] the credit and weight of... testimony [by a coparticipant] to be determined
by the jury or by the court") (quoting Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918)). Perhaps
the Court's broadest leap of faith about juries is its belief that they understand and will follow
judicial instructions. See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
The requirement that courts find other ways to reduce the risk of jury misestimation has support
in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987). In that case, the Court, in the course of finding it uncon-
stitutional to forbid from testifying a defendant whose memory had been hypnotically refreshed,
suggested a number of safeguards a jurisdiction could adopt to protect against the dangers of testi-
mony of that sort. 483 U.S. at 60-61.
251. Nonetheless, Part V, infra, discusses whether to adopt a variant of this model of
arbitrariness.
252. See People v. Sapia, 41 N.Y.2d 160, 166, 359 N.E.2d 688, 692, 391 N.Y.S.2d 93, 97 (1976)
(dictum) (if witness was an active participant in criminal transaction, prosecution must choose be-
tween granting immunity or dismissing the prosecution), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977).
253. Of course, the jury may not assess the information Witness provides under a grant of immu-
nity in the same way as it will assess his assertion of the privilege. With immunity, Witness may or
may not exculpate Defendant. If he asserts the privilege, the jury may undervalue or overvalue the
significance, thus hurting Defendant or the prosecution.
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multi-culprit crimes, by contrast, granting use immunity might impede the
prosecution's ability to convict Witness by requiring it to show that it had
obtained its evidence of Witness' guilt independently from his immunized
testimony.
In summary, courts' categorical refusal to let Defendants try to profit from
Witness' assertion seems, at least in single-culprit crimes, to be wrong under
either interpretation of arbitrariness.
B. WITNESS' ASSERTION MUST BE RELEVANT AND MATERIAL
As discussed in Part II.B, Witness' assertion in a single-culprit crime is
almost certainly relevant. Whether it is material is another matter.254
Rather than using the term "materiality" in its evidentiary sense,255 the
Supreme Court employs it to test whether to reverse a conviction if the de-
fendant did not receive information from the prosecution256 or was not per-
mitted to introduce evidence. 257 In those contexts, evidence is material, the
Court says, "if there is a reasonable possibility that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." 258
Whether Witness' assertion is material probably depends upon whether
one accepts the factual assumption that in a single-culprit crime, Witness'
interest lies in testifying, not in asserting the privilege. The rational juror,
having accepted that assumption, might be influenced by Witness' assertion,
depending upon the type and quantity of other evidence suggesting that Wit-
ness is guilty or that Defendant is not. The more evidence of Witness' com-
plicity, the easier it will be to understand why Witness asserts the privilege.
Paradoxically, however, one might also argue that the more evidence De-
fendant has of Witness' guilt, the less need Defendant has to try to benefit
from Witness' assertion.259 Forcing Witness to assert the privilege before the
254. Sometimes the Court describes the importance of the defense evidence differently. See
Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 ("critical"); Washington, 388 U.S. at 16 (relevant, material, and vital).
However, the Court probably has not tried to create a test for the defendant that embodies these
descriptions. In Washington, for example, the Court noted in its holding that the defendant had
been denied the right to "obtain[ ] witnesses... whose testimony would have been relevant and
material to the defense." 388 U.S. at 23 (citation omitted).
255. Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence merges materiality and relevancy into the single
term "relevancy." See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee's note.
256. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57-58 (1987).
257. Washington, 388 U.S. at 22-23.
258. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). Of late, the Court has discarded earlier
versions of materiality. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-13 (1976).
259. A problem arises in evaluating inadmissible information that points to Witness' guilt. For
example, Witness might have spoken in a way that provides circumstantial evidence of his guilt, but
that statement may not be admissible under any hearsay exception. Although the court can con-
sider inadmissible information in deciding admissibility issues, see FED. R. EVID. 104(a), it should
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jury might therefore be cumulative evidence. 260 Without studies indicating
how jurors would react to hearing Witness assert the privilege, claims that
Witness' assertion would have either an explosive or marginal impact on the
jury probably provide little more than a clue to the claimant's evaluation of
jury error.261
C. IS WITNESS' ASSERTION RELIABLE?
It is not clear whether a defendant must also show that the evidence meets
some test of trustworthiness to supersede the jurisdiction's exclusionary rule.
Although the Supreme Court in Chambers stressed that McDonald's out-of-
court admissions appeared reliable in light of the other evidence implicating
him, its analysis seemed more descriptive than evaluative. Nonetheless, de-
manding that Defendant establish the reliability of Witness' assertion would
create a burden similar to that which the prosecution must meet to rebuff a
defendant's hearsay objection under the confrontation clause.262 Although
Chambers could have met such a burden if McDonald had asserted the fifth
not use that information in deciding whether Witness' assertion was cumulative evidence unless it
also lets the jury consider that information.
260. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873 (1982) (if evidence the prosecu-
tion withholds is "merely cumulative to the testimony of available witnesses," it is not material).
One commentator argues that Witness' assertion would be cumulative evidence. See Hill, supra
note 174, at 1181-83. According to Professor Hill, Defendant's constitutional challenge should fail
if Defendant has enough other evidence of Witness' guilt to establish that the assertion is relevant
and that the two have not colluded. Id. at 1181-82. Defendant would need "to make a substantial
and specific showing, based on something more than [Defendant's] own assertions, that the
[W]itness' testimony, if given, would tend to be exculpatory." Id. at 1182. Hill believes that so
much evidence of Witness' guilt would exist if Defendant could satisfy this formidable test that
Defendant would only benefit "increment[ally]" if the jury were to learn that Witness had asserted
the privilege or if the jury observed Witness making the assertion. Id. at 1182-83. As a result,
because the prosecution cannot cross-examine Witness, Defendant should fail in the attempt to
benefit from Witness' assertion. Id.
Several observations are in order. First, Professor Hill surely inflates the test of relevancy. Sec-
ond, by disagreeing with his factual premises-that the prosecution would be considerably damaged
and Defendant would be aided only marginally if the jury learned of Witness' assertion-one evalu-
ates the issue differently. Professor Hill does not explore whether the prosecution should be re-
quired to protect itself by granting use immunity, nor does he examine the ways in which the court
can help the jury evaluate the assertion.
261. For what it is worth, I would find the assertion "material" and, indeed, "vital" (Washing-
ton) or "critical" (Chambers).
262. To satisfy the confrontation clause, when introducing hearsay, the prosecution must estab-
lish that the hearsay fits within a "firmly rooted" exception or that it bears "indicia of reliability" in
the context of the case. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). If the Court created a burden for a
defendant by noting in Chambers that McDonald's admissions "bore persuasive assurances of trust-
worthiness," 410 U.S. at 302, that burden would appear to exceed the "indicia of reliability" test the
prosecution must meet. In one way, this imbalance seems sensible because the effect of the confron-
tation and compulsory process clauses is not symmetrical. The confrontation clause works to ex-
clude hearsay that is otherwise admissible through an exception. The compulsory process (or due
process) clause enables the defendant to override an evidentiary exclusionary rule to introduce evi-
dence that the prosecution cannot. Despite this imbalance in the defendant's favor, we could slant
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amendment, it would stymie most Defendants who, like Chambers, claim to
have found the real culprit. In few cases-not even in Bowles-will there be
as much evidence of Witness' guilt as in Chambers.
In Dutton v. Evans,263 another confrontation clause case, the Court ffirted
with adopting a test that would be easier for Defendant to meet. The ambig-
uous, out-of-court statement of an alleged coparticipant allowed the jury to
infer that the defendant had participated in the grisly murder of three police
officers. 264 In one of its muddier attempts to explain the confrontation
clause, the Court rejected the defendant's claim that introducing this hearsay
statement would be unconstitutional. 265 For our purposes, Justice Stewart
made two interesting points in his plurality opinion. First, he noted that the
"mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for
the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials by assuring
that 'the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the
prior statement.' "266 Assuring that the factfinder has "a satisfactory basis
for evaluating the truth of the prior statement" is not the same as determin-
ing that the hearsay (or, in our case, Witness' assertion) is reliable. The plu-
rality seemed to say that as long as the jury can spot the problems with the
evidence, we should trust the jury's evaluation of it. Justice Stewart sup-
ported that interpretation of the confrontation clause by observing that the
hearsay declarant's statement "carried on its face a warning to the jury
against giving the statement undue weight." 267
Nonetheless, Justice Stewart immediately coupled this observation with
the dubious claim that there was no reason to doubt the reliability of the
alleged coparticipant's implication of the defendant.26 In other cases involv-
ing the confrontation clause, however, the Court has expected the hearsay to
bear "adequate 'indicia of reliability.' ",269 Thus, the Supreme Court has not
clearly ruled whether Defendant must demonstrate that Witness' assertion is
reliable.
admissibility even more in the defendant's favor by demanding no more, and perhaps even less,
proof of trustworthiness from him than we do from the prosecutor.
263. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
264. Id. at 76-78 (plurality opinion).
265. Id. at 88-89.
266. Id. at 90 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1969)). Justice Stewart did not
note that in Green, the Court added that the hearsay was admitted because it "possesse[d] other
indicia of 'reliability.'" Green, 399 U.S. at 161.
267. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 74.
268. The coparticipant reportedly said: "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Ev-
ans, we wouldn't be in this now." Id. at 78. According to Justice Stewart, the coparticipant spoke
spontaneously and against his penal interest. Id. at 89. Yet, the statement would have been inad-
missible under the excited utterance exception, FED. R. EVID. 803(2), and the penal interest excep-
tion, FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
269. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972).
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If Defendant must establish that Witness' assertion is reliable, it is not
clear what he must do. If Defendant must show that he did not collude with
Witness, he might meet that burden by demonstrating that their relationship
does not smack of collusion. If Defendant also must show that Witness risks
self-incrimination, he needs evidence to support his accusation of Witness.
Defendant will always have some information supporting that inference-
otherwise, he would be unable to satisfy the relevancy test. How much infor-
mation he needs, and whether it must be admissible as evidence, remain as
questions. Surely, in a case like Bowles, the defendant has amassed enough.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
If neither the current rules of evidence nor constitutional law permits De-
fendant to try to benefit from Witness' assertion, we might recast evidence
law to allow Defendant, indeed any party, to introduce relevant but other-
wise inadmissible evidence as long as that party discloses the evidence to his
opponent far enough in advance of trial to enable his opponent to investi-
gate.270 Although the Federal Rules of Evidence generally allow parties to
admit more evidence than did the common law, that codification remains
slanted to exclude evidence that does not meet certain conditions of
reliability.271
It would be unnecessary for our purposes to relax the law of evidence for
all parties. First, even though the Federal Rules of Evidence do not distin-
guish between criminal and civil litigation, we could retain the exclusionary
rules in civil cases to limit the amount of resources a civil litigant would need
to spend to investigate the otherwise inadmissible evidence his opponent had
disclosed. Second, in a criminal prosecution, we could relax the rules only
for the defendant. After all, we do not write on a completely clean slate: the
confrontation clause bars extending this proposal to include the prosecution.
270. The provision for generous discovery in civil cases makes this suggestion less appealing in
civil litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
271. This slant became more pronounced as the proposed rules were handed from one reviewing
body to the next. The Advisory and Standing Committees of the Judicial Conference ratcheted the
admissibility burden higher as they released each new draft. As one example, in the first published
draft, the class hearsay exceptions were treated as illustrations of the general rule that hearsay was
not excluded "if its nature and the special circumstances under which it was made offer assurances
of accuracy not likely to be enhanced by calling the declarant as a witness .... " PROPOSED FED.
R. EVID. 8-03(a) (Prelim. Draft 1969). By the second draft, those illustrations had been hardened
into the only exceptions. Id. rule 803 (Revised Draft 1971); see generally Tague, supra note 68, at
871-72.
The Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, a group that played a pivotal role in shap-
ing the rules, often seemed interested in enacting each member's understanding of the common law
in his or her own jurisdiction, as a review of the Subcommittee's markup sessions suggests. Again,
one example must suffice. The Subcommittee, worried about adopting a hearsay exception for penal
interest statements, added a collaboration requirement for the criminal defendant to meet. See
Tague, supra note 68, at 886-89.
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The imbalance in resources between defendants and the prosecution also sup-
ports relaxing the rules only for the defendant. Defendants lack the re-
sources to investigate otherwise inadmissible evidence that the prosecution
would disclose, and jurisdictions are not apt to give defendants the money
they would need to investigate.
Many will recoil at the prospect of relaxing the evidentiary restrictions
that apply to the criminal defendant. There is a palpable worry that the
criminal defendant may fabricate or spoil evidence to escape conviction. Our
Defendant's plight is only one of many examples. The criminal defendant
can discover only a small amount of the trove of information that the prose-
cution has amassed. 272 The defendant's obligation to disclose his intent to
defend on the ground of alibi rests on the fear he will concoct the defense.273
Of special concern is the defendant, like our Defendant, who seeks to shift
responsibility to another person. Not until the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence could a defendant in federal court introduce a declarant's
hearsay statement that exculpated the defendant. Yet, in enacting a hearsay
exception for penal interest statements, Congress so worried about
fabrication that it imposed upon the defendant a burden to establish the
trustworthiness of the statement that is unique in the law of evidence. 274 The
possibility of fabrication by the defendant could be significantly lessened by
conditioning any expansion of the defendant's ability to introduce otherwise
inadmissible evidence upon his disclosure, far in advance of trial, of whatever
evidence he intended to introduce. Notification would help the prosecution
in several ways. It would give the prosecution time to judge the weight of the
evidence and to search for ways to counter the anticipated impact upon the
jury that the evidence might have. In learning where the defendant intended
to mount his attack, the prosecution could move to reinforce its position at
that point. With the burden of giving away its tactical advantage through
disclosure, defendants would not disclose unless they believed the evidence
would withstand scrutiny by the prosecution.
272. The discovery rules in many jurisdictions are parsimonious. The prosecution's constitu-
tional obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence is narrow. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667, 682 (1985) (appropriate to reverse for failure to disclose "if there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different"). Under the Bagley test, the prosecution risks few reversals by not disclosing, especially
because the defendant has great difficulty learning what he did not receive.
273. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81 (1970) ("[g]iven the ease with which an alibi can be
fabricated, the State's interest in protecting itself against an eleventh-hour defense is both obvious
and legitimate"). Other disclosure obligations seem to turn more on the prosecution's need to in-
vestigate than on concerns about the reliability of the defendant's evidence. See FED. R. CRiM. P.
12.2(b) (disclosure of intent to introduce evidence of mental state).
274. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (provides in part that "[a] statement tending to expose the declar-
ant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement"). For a discussion of this im-
posing burden, see Tague, supra note 68, at 980-89.
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This proposal differs sharply from the present rules of evidence, even
though the Federal Rules of Evidence contain provisions that are superfi-
cially similar. Those provisions include the two catch-all hearsay exceptions,
rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), and the rule for summaries of documents, rule
1006. Like the proposal, those rules require the offering party to notify the
opponent of the evidence as a condition of introducing it. But those rules,
unlike the proposal, say that although disclosure is necessary, it is an insuffi-
cient condition for admitting the evidence. All three rules also require the
court to find that the evidence is reliable before admitting it.275
This proposal is also superficially similar to the discovery requirement that
the criminal defendant notify the prosecution of his intent to introduce cer-
tain evidence. 276 Just as our proposal requires Defendant to disclose his in-
tent to call Witness, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require a
defendant who intends to call an alibi witness or to defend on the ground of a
mental defect to identify the witnesses whom he will call.277 But our Defend-
ant would be helped considerably more by disclosing his intent to call Wit-
ness than other defendants are helped by satisfying current discovery
disclosure rules. Through disclosure, Defendant could surmount the eviden-
tiary exclusionary rule barring him from forcing Witness to assert the privi-
lege before the jury. In contrast, although disclosing the identity of an alibi
witness enables the defendant to call that person to testify,278 that witness'
testimony remains subject to every evidentiary objection. Offsetting the
greater benefit Defendant would receive through disclosure, however, is the
often greater risk he runs by disclosing. Consider first the risk a defendant
runs in disclosing his intent to call an alibi witness. This defendant does not
need to reveal what the witness will say, nor must he deliver a copy of any
statement that the witness has given to the defense.279 In interviewing the
witness, the prosecution might gather information to challenge the defend-
275. The catch-all hearsay exceptions condition admissibility upon a judicial finding, inter alia,
that the statement has "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" that are "equivalent" to the
guarantees in other hearsay exceptions. Applying this test, of course, is problematic because hear-
say under certain exceptions (for example, the business record exception, FED. R. EVID. 803(6))
appears to be more reliable on average than under other exceptions (such as the so-called dying
declaration, FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2)).
A summary may be introduced under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 only if the underlying
documents are themselves admissible. Paddack v. Dave Christen, Inc., 745 F.2d 1254, 1259-61 (9th
Cir. 1984). If those documents contain hearsay, the offeror must convince the court that they are
reliable by finding an applicable hearsay exception.
276. See supra note 142.
277. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 (alibi), 12.2 (mental defect).
278. Cf Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) (not unconstitutional to forbid defendant from
using testimony of alibi witness when defendant, in violation of state law, failed to notify prosecu-
tion of intent to call that witness).
279. A defendant who defends on the ground of mental defect needs to give the report of any
defense expert to the prosecution, but only if he has asked the prosecution to disclose certain infor-
[Vol. 78:1
THE FIFrH AMENDMENT
ant's defense. The prosecution is not likely to obtain useful information,
however, because if the defense thought that the prosecution might be
helped, it would not use the witness and thus would not need to disclose his
identity. The defense has no duty to disclose the identity of a person whose
story would conflict with the story of those witnesses he intends to call and
whose identities he does disclose. Moreover, if after disclosure the defendant
learns that the witness would say something inconsistent with the planned
defense, the defendant can withdraw the defense without harm. The jury
will never learn that the defendant had withdrawn the defense and thus can
draw no inference against the defendant from that change of position.
In contrast, our Defendant would incur great risk in disclosing Witness'
intent to assert the privilege and the evidence supporting his claim that Wit-
ness is the true culprit. In investigating Defendant's startling claim, the pros-
ecution could find other evidence of Defendant's guilt. It might, for
example, persuade Witness to testify by promising not to prosecute him or by
giving him immunity. In either instance, Witness might testify before a
grand jury, testimony that Defendant would not learn about until Witness
testified at Defendant's trial.280 Thus, Defendant would not learn how Wit-
ness intended to counter whatever evidence of Witness' guilt Defendant had
amassed. And, if Witness is guilty and lies to protect himself and inculpate
Defendant, then Defendant, through disclosure, will have contributed to his
own conviction.
The risk Defendant takes by disclosing parallels the risk a defendant runs
by asking the prosecution for discovery under rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Rule 16 constitutes an interesting bridge between the
defendant's fifth amendment protection not to disclose evidence and his sixth
amendment right to discover only exculpatory evidence. 281 Rule 16 creates a
system of reciprocal discovery that only the defendant can institute. The
defendant can trigger the government's obligation to disclose certain non-
exculpatory information, including documents, tangible objects, and reports
of examinations and tests, by asking for any of those sorts of items. How-
ever, the defendant must then disclose all similar items in his possession. For
the defendant who has documents or reports of experts or the like, disclosure
mation pursuant to rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. For further discussion, see
infra text accompanying note 281.
280. Under the Jencks Act, the government need not disclose the statement of a witness it calls in
a criminal trial until his direct examination is completed. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1982). This Act
magnifies Defendant's problem because, in calling Witness to testify, Defendant could not discover
what Witness had said in testifying before the grand jury. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(a). However,
the government might be able to use Witness' grand jury testimony in attempting to impeach Wit-
ness' claim that he would incriminate himself by testifying before the jury.
281. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 487-89 (1973) (finding unconstitutional an Oregon
statute that did not provide for reciprocal discovery; defendant could not be compelled to reveal
alibi witness if prosecution did not give defendant opportunity to discover State's rebuttal witness).
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poses the risk that he will alert the prosecution to the nature of his defense
and give the prosecution time to evaluate the probative value of his evidence.
The defendant must compare the potential damage from disclosure against
the benefit of obtaining the sorts of evidence he predicts he will receive.
This comparison resembles the assessment that Defendant must make
under our proposal. Each defendant runs the risk that the prosecution might
obtain information that could mortally damage his defense. Yet, the risks
differ somewhat because disclosure by our Defendant might enable the prose-
cution to use the information in its case-in-chief. As noted above, with notice
the prosecution might inveigle or compel Witness to testify against Defend-
ant. In contrast, a defendant, in responding to the prosecution's disclosure
under rule 16, will rarely reveal information that the prosecution can use in
its case-in-chief. If the defendant thought that were possible, he would not
trigger the provisions of rule 16. Notwithstanding the enhanced risk that our
Defendant faces, disclosure would not impinge upon his personal fifth
amendment protection because he would disclose by choice and not by legal
compulsion.2 2
In a single-culprit crime, therefore, Defendant would probably disclose
only if he had evidence of Witness' guilt. Although the court would not
evaluate the trustworthiness of Witness' assertion as a condition of letting
Defendant try to benefit, there are other checks for reliability. Unlike an
unavailable declarant whose hearsay statement exonerates the defendant,
Witness can be interviewed by the prosecution (by being subpoenaed if neces-
sary). Also, ethical and tactical considerations would combine to lead de-
fense counsel not to try to force Witness to assert the privilege before the jury
if he is worried that Defendant and Witness have colluded. 283
Does disclosure pose such a special risk for Defendant that his plight calls
for a unique solution? Or, should any defendant be able to introduce any
otherwise inadmissible but relevant evidence that he discloses in advance of
trial, as long as other procedural safeguards (like comment by the judge upon
the evidence) are used? The second, broader question is best considered in
connection with hearsay. By giving notice, may a defendant introduce hear-
say that fits no exception without regard to its trustworthiness? Proposals to
let the defendant introduce additional hearsay focus more on the unavailable
than the available declarant.284 Excluding defense-offered hearsay from an
282. This point assumes, of course, that Defendant has no constitutional right to force the prose-
cution to grant use immunity to Witness or to try to profit from Witness' assertion.
283. The ethical reason is counsel's obligation not to adduce fraudulent evidence; the tactical
reason is the fear that the jury, smelling collusion, might convict Defendant more readily.
284. There is no reason to consider at length whether to eliminate the barriers to the admission
of hearsay from an available declarant. The preference for live testimony probably condemns such
a possibility. See United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294, 299 (5th Cir. 1977) (trial court erred in
admitting hearsay under rule 803(24) of the Federal Rules of Evidence when declarant was avail-
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unavailable declarant sometimes seems wrenchingly unfair. To exclude a de-
clarant's admission that he committed the crime285 or that the defendant did
not 286 presents the disturbing possibility that the defendant is in fact inno-
cent. These defendants can grasp the exceptions for statements against penal
interest, dying declarations, or the catch-all exceptions to introduce some
hearsay. Yet, no one of these exceptions will always apply.
Some commentators would scrap the hearsay exceptions and convert the
issue of admissibility into one that the trial judge would consider, ad hoc, in
each case.287 Others would go further and eliminate all barriers to admissi-
bility,288 at least as long as admissibility is surrounded with procedural pro-
tections like disclosure28 9 and judicial comment about the hearsay's
significance.
Letting Defendant try to profit from Witness' assertion would be in line
with these relaxed approaches to hearsay. The same procedural devices sug-
gested by our proposal could substitute for a judicial finding that the hearsay
evidence is reliable. Notice of the intent to introduce hearsay would provide
the opponent with the opportunity to investigate whether the unavailable de-
clarant spoke as reported and why. 290 By sharing his evaluation with the
able to testify). Moreover, the defendant would gain no tactical advantage from such an approach.
If the defendant did not call an available declarant to testify, the jury might infer that the declarant
would dispute that he had spoken as reported or would reject what he had said. If, in fact, the
declarant would have done either in testifying, the defendant could always have used his out-of-
court statement to impeach him. With no burden of proof, the defendant is indifferent to the treat-
ment of a prior inconsistent statement as substantive or as impeaching evidence.
285. See, e.g., State v. Larsen, 91 Idaho 42, 49-50, 415 P.2d 685, 691-92 (1966) (witness admitted
to three people that he and not defendant had killed the victim; statement excluded to prevent
possible trend of defendants from falsely claiming that unavailable declarants had exonerated
them).
286. See State v. Chandler, 178 La. 7, 14-15, 150 So. 386, 388-89 (1933) (deceased told a doctor
moments after suffering injury that he had shot himself; statement excluded).
287. See Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REv. 331, 338-39 (1961).
288. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 503(a) (1942); Morgan & Maguire, Looking Back-
ward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 922 (1937) (arguing for admission of hear-
say from unavailable declarant offered by any party other than prosecution, when proposal might
encounter confrontation clause problems).
289. A problem is whether requiring the defendant to disclose would clash with his fifth amend-
ment right. By assuming that a clash would occur, the Advisory Committee dismissed whatever
interest it had in relaxing the hearsay ban for defendants. See The Advisory Committee [on the
Federal Rules of Evidence], Memorandum 19, at 22 (undated) (copy on file at The Georgetown Law
Journal). In that memorandum, Professor Cleary, the reporter to the Advisory Committee, wor-
ried whether the fifth amendment would protect the defendant from disclosing hearsay about which
he would testify, even if he could be made to disclose other hearsay. Id. If the defendant could
defeat a disclosure obligation by invoking the fifth amendment, Professor Cleary thought it unwise
to eliminate hearsay restrictions because otherwise the defendant could "choose his own rules of
admission and exclusion." Id. We can escape Professor Cleary's concern by conditioning admissi-
bility of hearsay upon disclosure by the defendant. If the defendant chose not to disclose in advance
of trial, he would need to satisfy a hearsay exception.
290. In each setting-Witness' assertion of the fifth amendment and the admission of hearsay-
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jury, the trial judge could spread before the jury the reasons why it might
credit or discount the hearsay. Depending upon one's evaluation of jury er-
ror, as long as the jury was informed of the problems with the hearsay, it
could be trusted to discern the evidence satisfactorily. 291
There is a major difference, however, between letting Defendant try to ben-
efit from Witness' assertion and eliminating the hearsay barrier to the admis-
sion of a statement from an unavailable declarant. Disclosure and judicial
comment reduce, but do not eliminate, the troubling feature of admitting the
hearsay statement of an unavailable declarant-the opponent's inability to
cross-examine that declarant. In contrast, Witness is only nominally un-
available. The prosecution can force him to testify by bestowing use immu-
nity. Thus, one distinctive feature of the hearsay statement from an
unavailable declarant-the opponent's inability to cross-examine him-ap-
plies only superficially to Witness. This difference suggests that we should
allow Defendant to try to utilize Witness' assertion even if we do not elimi-
nate the barriers that now prevent a defendant from introducing the hearsay
of an unavailable declarant.
Of course, many Defendants would prefer not to disclose before trial or
endure a withering judicial analysis of Witness' assertion. Those who have
colluded would risk having their conspiracy unmasked. All would lose the
drama of unexpectedly calling Witness to assert the privilege before the
jury.292 But our proposal would test the good faith of Defendant in calling
Witness. Defendants should welcome this proposal if it constitutes the only
way of convincing the courts to let them try to benefit from Witness'
assertion.
VI. CONCLUSION
No Defendant has succeeded in forcing Witness to assert the fifth amend-
ment before the jury in the hope that the jury will infer from the assertion
that Defendant is innocent. At least in single-culprit crimes, an innocent
Defendant may therefore fail to convince the jury that the prosecution has
we could treat the defendant differently from the prosecution because of the imbalance in resources.
With its resources, the prosecution could benefit from the time to investigate that disclosure would
provide. In contrast, time to investigate will not be especially beneficial to the indigent defendant
unless he is given resources to investigate. It is not likely that jurisdictions will give more resources
to defendants in exchange for relaxing the hearsay ban on the prosecution. Hence, we could relax
the admission requirements for defendants while keeping them for the prosecution.
291. For expressions of belief (and disbelief) in the jury's ability to evaluate hearsay, see Swift,
Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 495, 497 n.1 (1987) (citing articles expressing
confidence and lack of confidence in a jury's ability to evaluate hearsay).
292. Of course, neither the attorney for the defense nor for the prosecution is supposed to call a
witness whom he knows will invoke the fifth amendment. See supra note 5. Yet, because many of
the cases discussed in this article postdate adoption of that ethical prohibition, attorneys are either
unaware of the rule or choose to ignore it.
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not met its burden of proof. To bar Defendant in this way is unfair. It is also
wrong in terms of evidentiary law and arguably constitutional law. One pur-
pose of this article has been to explore how to help Defendant. Another,
broader purpose has been to use this subject as a way to explore whether
courts can reduce the problems that ordinarily lead them to exclude evi-
dence, and whether, having done so, they should then admit challenged
evidence.
The sensible solution to Defendant's plight is twofold. In single-culprit
cases, Witness should be forced to testify through a grant of use immunity.
In those few cases in which the prosecution can justify not granting use im-
munity to Witness, the jury should watch Witness assert the fifth amendment
and assess what that assertion might mean. No court has taken either ap-
proach. Courts almost uniformly say that the prosecution alone can decide
whether to grant immunity.293 Our primary purpose has not been to chal-
lenge this judicial position (although that has been a secondary goal). In-
stead, our purpose has been to explore one consequence of not giving
immunity to Witness.
Should Defendant be permitted to try to benefit from Witness' assertion of
the fifth amendment? To prevent the jury from considering Witness' asser-
tion on relevancy grounds seems indefensible. For example, if Witness, when
asked whether he committed the crime with which Defendant is charged,
responds by asserting the fifth amendment, one inference is inevitable: Wit-
ness believes that by answering truthfully, he will provide damning informa-
tion that the prosecution could use to substitute him for Defendant. Witness'
assertion is relevant, as the court must have indirectly found in deciding that
Witness might incriminate himself by testifying.
Courts have resorted to other arguments to bar Defendant from trying to
benefit. Most notably, they fear either that the jury will overvalue the asser-
tion of the privilege or that Defendant and Witness have colluded. The diffi-
culty the jury would face in wrestling with the meaning of the assertion is
exaggerated. The jury's problem could be reduced by judicial comment and
eliminated by prosecutorial grant of use immunity. Courts could also reduce
the problem of collusion by conditioning Witness' appearance upon advance
disclosure by Defendant of the evidence supporting Defendant's claim that
Witness' assertion is relevant. This exchange is an extreme step. The prose-
cution may find information that it could employ in its case-in-chief against
Defendant. But this is a risk Defendant should accept if disclosure is the
only way to convince the courts to let him force Witness to assert the privi-
lege before the jury. Courts should also accept this exchange. With notice,
293. See supra note 13.
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the prosecution can prepare to test the significance of Witness' assertion,
thereby eliminating any need for courts to worry about prejudice.
This exchange-disclosure in return for admissibility-opens the possibil-
ity of letting the criminal defendant surmount other evidentiary restrictions
by disclosing in advance of trial the otherwise inadmissible evidence. Such
an exchange warrants more examination than the cursory exploration it has
received in this article. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that re-
jecting such a change in evidence law does not mean that Defendant's at-
tempt to benefit from Witness' assertion must also be rejected. The fact that
Witness could be made to testify through a grant of use immunity is the key
difference.
One probable result of letting Defendant try to benefit is that the prosecu-
tion will choose to grant use immunity in situations in which it currently will
not. In this indirect way, then, the jury will learn what Witness seeks to hide
about his and Defendant's complicity. However, regardless of the prosecu-
tion's decision on the grant of use immunity, courts should force Witness to
assert the fifth amendment in front of the jury, at least in single-culprit
crimes. If they do, those Defendants (hopefully rather few in number) who
claim they are innocent and who produce the person they say is the culprit
will properly have a better chance of convincing the jury to acquit.
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